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INTRODUCTION

According to Hannah Arendt, the liberal conception of human
rights is troublesome.

Specifically, the idea of human rights

that was posited in the United Nations' Declaration of Human
Rights was inadequate when it came to preventing the continuing
spread of statelessness -- one of the events that spurred its
creation.

In a 1949 article, Arendt sharply criticized this

conception and any other conceptions of human rights that are
rooted in the natural right tradition.
Underlying her criticisms of such rights is a tension in
her thought between the practical need that she sees for
universal human rights and her dissatisfaction with the
philosophical construction of universal rights.

For Arendt,

rights are born of political activity within the political
community.

Any rights, then, that claim to be "universal", that

are pressed upon the political community from the outside, can
be justifiably considered irrelevant by the political community.
Thus, she asks, can there be such a thing as a right that
belongs to individuals solely because they are biologically
human (a universal right) and, at the same time, leave
individuals free to discover their own political character (a
contingent right)?

The tension is most clearly displayed by
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juxtaposing Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which Arendt attempts to
defend the concept of crimes against humanity, and the end of
the second section of The Origins of Totalitarianism (based on
her 1949 article), in which she defends a Burkean conception of
human rights.

This thesis questions whether the tension

apparent in Arendt's work is truly an inconsistency in Arendt's
thinking or if it can be resolved within the framework of her
broader, more comprehensive, work.

In other words, does Hannah

Arendt defend a notion of human rights?

If so, what is that

notion and how is it defended?
Arendt refers to traditional notions of human rights when
she labels human rights as the "step-child" of nineteenth
century political thought.

Unlike nineteenth century rights

theorists, she argues, twentieth century rights theorists need
no longer rely on mere conceptions of the abstract human being:
we have empirically observed it.

For Arendt, one of the most

important developments of this century was the appearance of
superfluousness, first showing itself in the form of
statelessness.

Where eighteenth and nineteenth century

philosophers conceived of the abstract human being as alone
among other lone human beings in the state of nature, Arendt
claims instead that the true abstract human being is, like the
stateless, locked out of the human world altogether.

If to

retain one's humanity is to belong to the humanly fabricated
world and to have one's actions and speech made relevant by the
context of that world, then to be stateless is to be in the
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position of having one's actions and speech lose their meaning
and, thus, to lose one's humanity.

This is precisely the

position into which Arendt believes stateless peoples and·
persons were placed.
Arendt argues that the rise of statelessness demonstrates
the impotence of earlier human rights doctrines.

These

conceptions of human rights were not defensible philosophically
and had never been practically implemented.

Thus, there were

neither philosophical constructs nor practical precedents to
prevent the emergence of statelessness.

In fact, such human

rights were not even claimed by those who were stateless.
Rather, the stateless relied on their past claims to national
rights, harkening back to a time where their rights had
political significance and reviving their cultures, languages
and, through them, their political history.
Based on the evidence presented by this century, Arendt
believes that a new conception of human rights is warranted and,
in fact, required.

The new conception can not be found by

reexamining natural rights, however, which has been the response
of most other thinkers.

Rather, a politically compelling notion

of human rights can be found only by questioning what types of
laws implemented by what types of institutions would have been
capable of preventing statelessness.

Thus, by locating a

deterrent for statelessness, Arendt hopes to find a new notion
of human rights that holds clout.
But beyond the narrow goal of uncovering her views on human
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rights theory as it stood suring the 1940s, the thesis questions
whether Hannah Arendt's analysis of human rights has anything to
contribute to current debates concerning human rights.

Although

this is not the primary goal of the thesis, it is worthwhile
posing this question in order to place her thinking in the
context of human rights discourse in general.

This second

question also brings us closer to Arendt's criticism of
traditional ideas of human rights.
Since Arendt wrote the 1949 article, a large number of
studies have been written on the notion of human rights.

Most

of this work has not challenged the natural right foundation of
human rights.

It has, instead, focused on the relation between

right and duty, on the one hand, and on the content of human
rights, on the other.

Even within the boundaries to which the

literature limits itself, Arendt's basic criticisms of human
rights have not been responded to.

The following briefly

outlines these basic criticisms in reference to the more recent
literature on human rights.
Arendt has several specific criticisms of human rights
which fall into three broad categories.

First, since rights are

only necessary in the political community, the idea of natural
rights is inherently flawed.

Of late, scholars have generally

and indirectly agreed with Arendt on this point and prefer the
term "moral right" to natural rights.

This, they argue,

reflects the social roots of rights -- human or otherwise
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and, at the same time, emphasizes their universal nature. 1

As

Martin and Nickel admit, "the word 'moral' seems to be doing
much of the same work in this context as the word 'natural' used
to do." 2

The important advantage of the term moral rights is

that moral norms, upon which rights are based, can be
conventional -- natural rights can not be.
Problems arise only when moral rights are intended to be
applied world-wide, especially when relevant world-wide moral
norms do not exist.

However, as Martin and Nickel point out, it

is not important that the moral norms are actually crossculturally agreed upon.

Rather, the moral norms can be

"critical," meaning that they represent what the moral norms in
each culture ought to be. 3

It is altogether unclear how such

rights are not, for all practical purposes, as politically
irrelevant to political communities which do not discover them
themselves as are natural rights.

In other words, Arendt might

have responded, to the society that creates them, moral rights
are conventional; but to the society that they are pressed upon,
they are natural.

Whatever human rights end up being, says

Arendt, they must be both politically compelling and universal
-- they must have the capacity to force just laws into being
while not robbing the political community of the opportunity to

1. Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Foundations of Philosophy Series, 1973), 84-85.
2. Rex Martin and James W. Nickel, "Recent Work on the Concept
of Rights," American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (Jul 1980): 165.
3.

Martin and Nickel, 175.
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discover them themselves.
Arendt's second class of criticisms has to do with to whom
the rights belong and towards whom or what the rights are·
addressed.

Arendt asks:

What is protected by human rights and

who or what is responsible for providing that protection?

To

the first half of the question it is evident that the U.N.
Declaration contends that the individual is protected.
Virtually all human rights theorists agree. 4

The responses to

the second half of the question are less unanimous.

Some, like

Cranston and Raphael, hold that human rights are claimed against
other individuals;

others, like Feinberg, hold that they are

claimed against the government; still others respond that the
answer depends on the situation.
To Arendt, the responses of natural rights theorists to
both halves of the question are wrong.

She does not think that

merely the well-being of many, many individuals is protected by
human rights.

Rather, the whole of civilization is protected.

Thus, Arendt's plea for an examination of human rights is
infused with an urgency more profound than the pleas of natural
rights theorists.

Further, the agent that has the capacity to

promote human rights is not the individual or the state -- but
both in every situation.

Human rights can only be protected

when they are publicly and consciously grafted into state and

4.
See, for example: Cranston, M., "Human Rights, Real and
Supposed," and D.D. Raphael, "Human Rights, Old and New," chaps.
in ed. D.D. Raphael, Political Theory and the Rights of Man
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967); and Miller,
D., Social Justice (Glasgow: Oxford, 1976).
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international institutions.

Human rights are not protected

through personal "duty'', but through the efforts of individuals
and communities to assure the survival of civilization.
Arendt's final class of criticisms of traditionallycontrived notions of human rights has to do with how they are
defended.

Although most human rights theorists can identify a

real live human rights violation "when they see it," their ideas
concerning human rights are only partially based on empirical
evidence.

Where they all beery the Nazi concentration camps,

only Arendt dissects the actual political events that led to
their creation.

It is upon this wholly empirical foundation

that Arendt builds her ideas concerning human rights.

Thus, as

we will see in the first chapter of this thesis, Arendt holds
that no notion of "natural" human rights can be defended because
such notions are based upon a picture of the abstract human
being that has never appeared on earth in such a way that it
could actually be observed and examined.

Furthermore, Arendt

asks, if natural conceptions of human rights are correct, why
are the human rights of persons and peoples continuously
violated -- even in countries whose constitutions are based upon
them -- and, most important, how could statelessness continue to
occur?

Certainly, Arendt believes, natural rights notions of

human rights have held no political clout when they have been
most necessary.

This in itself points to the flaws that result

from their non-empirical foundation.
Arendt contends that instead of being based on human
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experience, traditionally-contrived notions of human rights "had
never been philosophically established but merely formulated,
[and] had never been politically secured but merely
proclaimed. " 5

It is difficult, based on the foregoing

discussion, to postulate that her opinion would have changed
today.
This thesis attempts to draw out Arendt's specific concerns
with conceptions of human rights that are based on the natural
right tradition.

The first chapter will discuss more fully

Arendt's criticisms of human rights and will show how human
rights were powerless to prevent the rise of statelessness and
of correcting its effects.

Arendt's critique has two

dimensions: human rights were not substantive enough either
philosophically or practically to deal with statelessness.
Thus, included in the discussion are Arendt's philosophical as
well as practical critique of human rights.
The second chapter focuses on what form Arendt believes a
legitimate concept of human rights should take.

Her diagnosis

of how statelessness became possible is outlined by reviewing
her thoughts regarding world alienation.

If world alienation is

associated with the rise of statelessness then any meaningful
concept of human rights must have the capacity to reverse it.
Therefore, the chapter ends by describing her three categories
of rights, fitting them into their appropriate roles in relation

5.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 3 ed.
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1973), 447.

(New
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to solving the problems presented by world alienation.
Since one of Arendt's most convincing criticisms of
traditional concepts of human rights is that they can not be put
into practice, it is imperative for Arendt to show that her
notion of human rights, in fact, can be put into practice.

The

third chapter will examine her struggle with this issue by
looking, first, at her analysis of the Adolf Eichmann trial and,
second, at her critique of the nation-state system.

Based upon

the issues raised, the chapter will conclude by discussing what
types of international and intranational structures are required
to assure that human rights are protected.
The last chapter will attempt to do two things.

First,

Arendt's thoughts on human rights will be summarized; the
discussion will try to determine if her various thoughts
comprise an actual theory of human rights in its own right or
whether they are backdrops or appendages to other, more central
components of her work.

The second objective of the last

chapter will be to ask if Arendt's views of human rights,
regardless of what she intended, can inform current debates.
What, if anything, can human rights theorists who frame their
arguments within the natural right tradition learn from Arendt?
It is hoped that this exercise will lead to a fuller
understanding of the efficacy of human rights as an
international standard of political conduct today.

CHAPTER 1
THE "STEPCHILD" OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

To Hannah Arendt, traditionally conceived concepts of human
rights

(e.g., human rights derived from the natural right

tradition) were ill-defined.

She quipped that the constitutions

of human right organizations "showed an uncanny similarity in
language and composition to that of societies for the prevention
of cruelty to animals." 1

According to Arendt, there was

something inherently nonsensical and out-of-place about
traditional concepts of human rights when they were applied to
the events of this century.

Arendt claims that, following World

War I, "the very phrase 'human rights' became for all concerned
-- victims, prosecutors, and onlookers alike -- the evidence of
hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy." 2

She

suggests that natural right theorists could not and did not
devise a construct of human rights that dealt adequately with
twentieth century political problems.
However, Arendt held that a notion of human rights,
properly conceived, is necessary.

She appears to appeal to this

other concept of human rights as she tries to disentangle the

1.

Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 292.

2.

Ibid., 2 91.
10
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meaning of the phrase "crimes against humanity" in her report on
the Eichmann trial.

Arendt sought to retrieve human rights from

the position that they had fallen into -- one of political
irrelevance -- by reconstructing them based on the experiences
of the twentieth century.

This experience could not have been

anticipated by eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers
whose thought stood at the foundation for traditional concepts
of human rights.
For Arendt, one of the unprecedented and most significant
developments of the twentieth century was the appearance of
statelessness -- persons who not only were deprived of their
political home but who also had no hope of finding a new one had
never existed before.

Where certain rights were once thought to

be inalienable, the status and conditions of the stateless
indicated that no rights were so sacred or indigenous to the
human animal as to be "given at birth".

The plight of stateless

individuals and comr:lunities warranted a new look at human
rights, the rights upon which all other rights were supposed to
have been based:

if they exist, what they are, where they come

from and what obligations they place on the body politic.
Arendt begins by examining the events preceding World War
II closely and concludes that certain political developments of
the twentieth century paved the way for the rise of
statelessness.

Two forces in particular shaped the complexion

of statelessness:

1) the reorganization of Europe that followed

World War I which itself was rooted to a significant degree in
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the race-thinking of the nineteenth century, and 2) the
inability of the natural right tradition to prevent the
reorganization of Europe from turning against itself.

The Rise of Statelessness
Before discussing how statelessness arose, it is first
necessary to discuss what Arendt claims that stateless is and
how it differs from other, earlier forms of exile. There are two
differences between the traditional refugee and the new refugee:
what turned a person into a refugee and the relationship between
the refugee and protective law.

Traditionally, a person became

a refugee when his or her actions or beliefs were such that he
or she required international asylum. 3

Never completely

breaking the ties with his or her homeland, the refugee found
civil protection in a new country which protected his or her
right to think and to act freely.

The new country expected that

the refugee either a) truly belonged to his or her original
political community orb) would become a member of the new
political community.
entity is not new. 4

Forced migration to another political
What is new is not the crime but the

innocence of the refugee and "not the loss of a home but the
impossibility of finding a new one." 5

3.

Ibid. , 2 8 0.

4.
Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" The Modern
Review 3 (1949): 26.
5.

Ibid. , 2 6 .
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According to Arendt, it is the essence of the act of
deeming persons as stateless that the refugees' acts are
irrelevant to the decision to make them stateless.

The European

stateless became refugees not because of who they were (i.e.:
what they believed or what they did) but because of what they
were (i.e.: Armenians, Jews, etc.) . 6

Thus, they gained refugee

status because of what might be termed the conscious blindness
of nation-states to their actions and speech.
Unlike traditional refugees, the stateless are abstracted
from political society -- from the world through which their
unique selves can be revealed.

By being in this condition,

their speech and their actions have no relevance.

They may be

free to speak and to move about; but neither their speech nor
their movement has any consequence to anyone but themselves:
. their freedom of movement, if they have it at all,
gives them no right to residence which even the jailed
criminal enjoys as a matter of course; and their freedom of
opinion is a fool's freedom, for nothing they think matters
anyhow .
. The fundamental deprivation of human rights takes
place first and above all in depriving a person of a place
in the world which makes his opinions significant and his
actions effective. 7
This point is exemplified by the treatment of the Jews who were
expelled from Germany not because they were enemies of the
German state but because of what they categorically and
irreversibly were:

Jews.

Jews were treated as enemies "without

first having given them the chance to have opinions and choose

6.

Ibid., 27.

7.

Ibid., 29.
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sides." 8

In other words, Jews were criminalized without giving

them the chance to become criminals.

The unilateral expectation

that any action or speech generated by the Jews would and could
have no significant influence on their fate deprived them of
their place in the human world.

Thus, "Jews never were

recognized as full-fledged enemies of Nazism because their
opposition did not rest upon conviction or action.

They

[ instead] had been deprived of the faculty for both. " 9

In this

way, the loss of the world corresponds to the loss of one's
human appearance, for to lose the world which makes our actions
and speech meaningful is "to transform men into something they
are not . " 10
It is worth pausing here to note that the insignificance of
the thoughts and actions of the stateless individual became
poignantly real to Arendt when she was imprisoned in 1939.
Especially telling is her account of why she did not, although
she serioulsy considered doing so, take her own life while held
in an internment camp.

She reports that whenever she asked

herself whether she should commit suicide, the answer that came
to her was "somewhat of a joke."

Later, she articulated the

"joke" :
The general opinion [among the internees] held that one had
to be abnormally asocial and unconcerned about general
events if one was still able to interpret the whole

8.

Ibid. , 2 9 .

9.

Ibid. , 2 9 .

10. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), 183.

15
accident [of being imprisoned] as personal and individual
bad luck and, accordingly, ended one's life personally and
individually. But the same people, as soon as they
returned to their individuals lives, being faced with
seemingly individual problems, changed once more to the
insane optimism [manifest in a violent courage for life]
which is next door to depair. 11
Suicide, which presupposed that the internment was personally
deserved, and the "violent courage for life," which presupposed
that one's acts could make a difference, both required a social
context in order to be made significant or real.

However, the

internees had been abstracted from the world, from all social
context.
person.

Despair was the only remaining option for the sane
In this way, the stateless drifted in unreality.

The

joke was that Arendt did not have the power to return the
rejection that the world handed to her even through such an
extreme act as suicide.

Worldless, powerless, she could find no

vindication.
"Conscious blindness" had its political roots in the
Minority Treaties that were negotiated at the close of the First
World War.

Designed to assure the stability of the European

nation-state system, the treaties gave national sovereignty to
the ethnic majority and established "official" relationships
between the ethnic majority and the larger ethnic minorities in
each nation-state.

The Minority Treaties provided explicit

protection to large minorities; however, they provided no
protection to smaller minorities.

Small minorities possessed

11. As quoted in Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For
Love of the World (New Haven: Yale Univerity Press, 1982), 154.
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only the indirect protection of the League of Nations.
Since only nation-states were represented in the League of
Nations, Arendt contends that the newly formed international
body held little hope of resolving inter-ethnic problems.

The

mere formulation of the Minority Treaties itself implied a
certain intolerance of minorities not protected by national law:
these other minorities must "be either assimilated or
liquidated. " 12

In addition, to the extent that they presumed

that this level of intolerance was acceptable, the Minority
Treaties and the League of Nations ignored the inter-state
nature of the minorities. 13
The Congress of Organized National Groups in European
States was formed by the minority groups that were not protected
by the Minority Treaties as a means of articulating common
concerns of minorities to the League of Nations.

However, the

Congress became a forum for pursuing ethnic, not common,
interests and was held together by the tenuous and fated
cooperation of the Germans and the Jews -- the two largest
minority groups in Europe. 14
The desire for political stability permitted conscious
blindness to become institutionalized in the form of the League
of Nations and the Minority Treaties.

The League was "neither

willing nor able to overthrow the laws by which nation-states

12.

Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 273.

13.

Ibid., 273, 278.

14.

Ibid., 274.

17
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exis

Having no reliable avenue for representation,

untreatied minority groups became politically irrelevant to the
stability of the European nation-state system.

Untreatied·

minorities no longer needed to be negotiated with, they only
needed to be stabilized.
The risk of expulsion was great for such peoples.

The

nation-states which participated in mass denationalizations
"presupposed a state structure which, if it was not yet fully
totalitarian, at least would not tolerate any opposition and
would rather lose its citizens than harbor people with different
views. " 16

Although extreme intolerance was shown by only a

subset of European nation-states,
. there was hardly a country left on the Continent that
did not pass between the two wars some new legislation
which.
. was always phrased to allow for getting rid of
a great number of its inhabitants at any opportune moment. 17
The first of these laws, significantly, came from France. 18
But it was not only the untreatied minorities who had
reason to fear being expelled.

The treatment of treatied

minorities as well, such as the Jews and Armenians, proved that
Minority Treaties could be used to "single out certain groups
for eventual expulsion. " 19

15.

Ibid., 273.

16.

Ibid., 278.

17.

Ibid., 278-279.

18.

Ibid., 279.

19.

Ibid., 282.

18
Once expelled from one political entity, the impossibility
of finding a new home was exacerbated by the sheer numbers of
the stateless.

The right to asylum was always conceived a~ a

right for the exceptional few.

Even if the stateless were

exiled for political activities on their part, other countries
could not have handled the volume of those who would have
requested asylum.
Civilized countries had offered the right to asylum to
refugees who, for political reasons, had been persecuted by
their governments .
. The trouble arose when it appeared
that the new categories of persecuted were far too numerous
to be handled by an unofficial practice designed for
exceptional cases. 20
And where at one time peoples could relocate to a new continent
(i.e.:

the Puritans in North America), such an option was no

longer available.
The calamity [of the stateless] did not arise out of lack
of civilization, backwardness or mere tyranny, but, on the
contrary, could not be repaired because there was no longer
any "uncivilized" spot on earth, because, whether we like
it or not, we have really started to live in One World.
Only in a completely organized humanity could a loss of
home and political status become identical with being
expelled from humanity altogether. 21
In the past, not even a tyrant could deprive the individual of
human status: 22 if all other options failed, the individual could
take his or her family or community elsewhere and begin a new
political world.

Today, no such luxury exists.

"It [is] not a

20.

Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 27.

21.

Ibid., 30.

22.

Ibid., 30.

19
problem of space but of political organization." 23

The

imperialistic exploits of the nineteenth century redefined the
frontiers in the uncivilized world, which had formerly been
perceived as places of political refuge, to be the periphery of
civilization where refuge from civilization is no longer
possible.
Non-sovereign nationalities had no options by which to
escape the predicament presented by the reorganized European
nation-state system.

They could neither petition for adequate

representation nor create a new political entity in a foreign
geographic location.

In this respect, the minorities either

were on the verge of becoming or had already become worldless;
they were purged from the concrete human organization that gave
their speech and actions meaning.

According to Arendt, these

refugees, the stateless, were the first historical manifestation
of the nineteenth century enigma "the abstract human being,"
persons without a world.

Philosophical Weaknesses of Human Rights
The political developments of the twentieth century only
tell half of the story of how the stateless actually came into
being.

According to Arendt, there was no adequate philosophical

or practical counter-force to the creation of statelessness
after the First World War.

On the one hand, this convinces her

that statelessness really was unprecedented.

23.

Ibid., 26.

On the other hand,

20
and more important, this convinces her of the philosophical and
practical impotence of the Rights of Man doctrine.
Arendt uses the terms the "Rights of Man" and "natural
rights" interchangeably.

Her language indicates that she groups

together any ideas of rights that are founded on the natural
right tradition: she contends that any laws justified by appeals
to nature are nullified by politics.

Rights, then, that are

based on natural right can not demand any obligations from
society. 24

It might be fair to say that, to Arendt, the term

"natural rights" is an oxymoron:

rights, by the fact that they

carry an obligation to the political community, can only be
rooted in the communal experience.

An individual in the state

of nature has no need for rights since he or she is, by
definition, solely self-concerned.

Alone, individuals are not

involved in a social grouping through which rights would become
necessary.

Thus, natural rights can not exist.

In addition to the terms "Rights of Man" and "natural
rights", she uses the terms "human rights" and "national rights"
(or "citizen rights").

Similar to natural rights, human rights

designates the essence of rights that are derived from the
individuals's biological humanness.

They can not be conveyed

directly in positive law, however, where law becomes "an
instrument of the nation. " 25

National rights -- the rights of

the citizen -- are the practical, positivistic formulations of

24.

Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297-298.

25.

Ibid., 230.

21
human rights.
Human rights differ from natural rights in that human
rights never were philosophically explored and defended during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 26

Because of this,

Arendt refers to human rights as the "stepchild" of nineteenth
century political thought. 27

Instead of being the central tenet

of revolutionary thought, they were instead only claimed by
those who had no other rights through which to participate in
the political community. 28
Conceptions of human rights based on natural right offered
no philosophical counter-force to the rise of statelessness.
All conceptions of rights -- human, natural or national -- based
upon natural right are fundamentally limited in three ways.
First, natural right itself is apolitical, according to Arendt.
Natural right exists and is active where individuals are
abstracted from community; rights, however, exist and are
relevant only in a human community. 29

Thus, natural rights have

only limited bearing, if any, on our political world.

If

politics exists only where individuals co-exist, then law which
applied to individuals where they do not co-exist can not be
used to guide the activities of politics.
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For example, Arendt claims that the notion of equality has
no relation to natural law, but rather is related to the
political world.

If, in nature, human beings are unequal, in

society, they need not be.

"Equality is not given us but is the

result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the
principle of justice," 30 which is discoverable only through the
experience of community.

Laws concerning equality are out of

place in the natural world where individuals are essentially
private and self-concerned.

In the same way, natural laws are

out of place in political, public society.
Second, natural rights theorists could not have imagined
the true relationship between the individual and the state.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, natural rights
theorists could only invent an idea of the human being
abstracted from society -- they could make no empirical
observations:
. the paradox involved in the declaration of
inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an
"abstract" human being who seemed to exist nowhere, for
even savages lived in some kind of social order. 31
Tyranny, the cause of their concerns, no matter how ruthless,
never could strip an individual of inalienable rights and
thereby strip him or her of his or her humanity. 32

This

conception, however, presupposed that human beings could simply
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transport their political world elsewhere when negotiations
failed.

The only important human right that was derived from

natural rights

-- the right of asylum -- was thus defended.

Individuals had bargaining power.

But, Arendt claims, such

individuals are not abstract human beings at all.

Abstract

human beings, instead, are simply ignored, not bargained with.
And the first glaring fact was that [the stateless].
were no longer .
. a liability and an image of shame for
prosecutors .
. Innocence, in the sense of complete lack
of responsibility was the mark of their rightlessness as it
was the seal of their loss of political status. 33
Abstract human beings have no political bargaining power
whatsoever.

Natural rights theorists could have imagined

neither what abstract human beings looked like (because they did
not exist at the time) nor which rights would be necessary in
order for them to maintain or retrieve their concreteness.
In the twentieth century, however, human beings abstracted
from society have been empirically observed.

"Mankind.

which was only a concept or an ideal for eighteenth century man,
has grown into a hard, inescapable reality." 34

What Arendt sees

as the relationship between the individual and the state varies
radically from natural rights theorists.

The abstract human

being remains an atom, but is not alone among other atoms
exclusively.

The family of nations and the One World have

become synonymous.

Thus, the abstract human being stands

outside the whole of the fabricated world, cast out.

With no
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place remaining within which another human world can be created,
the abstract human being can not become concrete again.
Regardless of treatments, independent of liberties or
oppression, justice or injustice, [the stateless] have lost
all those parts of the world and all those aspects of human
existence which are the result of our common labor, the
outcome of the human artifice, 35
And since to be human a person must belong to some world, there
no longer can be an abstract human being, for once a person is
abstract, he or she is no longer human.

To be cast out of one

state is to be cast out of humanity.
Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time
considered under the image of a family of nations, had
reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of
these tightly organized closed communities found himself
thrown out of the family of nations altogether. 36
And thus, thrown out of humanity.

For "the loss of home and

political status [has] become identical with expulsion from
humanity altogether." 37

The stateless can not be seen or heard

by anyone -- not even by other nation-states.

The twentieth

century has taught us that there is no such thing as inalienable
rights.
Finally, natural rights theorists attempted to replace
history with nature as the moral referent.
became subject to Burke's criticism:

In doing this, they

that is, nature offers no

moral reference point at all but merely a biological one.
Nature leaves humankind morally adrift because it cuts it off
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from its world.

Civilized human beings become no more and no

1ess than uncivilized savages. 38

"It is precisely individual

life which now comes to occupy the positions once held by the
, life' of the body politic, " 39 so that "to stay alive under all
circumstances [has J become a holy duty. " 40
The common element in Burke's and Arendt's thinking is
their concern with the world's durability.

Echoing Burke's idea

of political inheritance, Arendt claims that the things of the
world and the web of human relationships gives the human world
"the stability and solidity without which it could not be relied
upon to house the unstable and mortal creature which is man." 41
But more than just stabilizing the natural creature, the world
offers "mortals a dwelling place more permanent and stable than
themselves; " 42 it is "a home for men during their life on
earth. " 43

Furthermore, when Arendt writes of the laws that

govern the world, as opposed to those which govern nature, she
shadows Burke by emphasizing equality as a means to communicate
between generations.

"If men were not equal, they could neither

understand each other and those who come before them nor plan
for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come
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after them.
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But it is not so much that Arendt agrees completely with
Burke's position against the Rights of Man as that she
sympathizes with his position.

She asks herself the same

questions that Burke asks himself:

Are we on the brink of doing

something unforgivable and irredeemable?
destroying our civilization?

Are we on the brink of

Like Burke, Arendt links rights to

the political community, to shared obligation.
We now know even better than Burke all rights materialize
only within a given political community, that they depend
45
on our fellow-men
As Dossa puts it, "The right to life itself is in jeopardy when
that right is unsupported by a framework of politics. " 46

Arendt

seeks to remove human rights from the realm of "charity", where
she claims the Rights of Man have haphazardly sent them, into
the realm of obligation. 47

Agreeing with Burke, Arendt holds

that rights can only be found in the shared obligation that is
the inheritance of the civilized world.

The loss of this world

brings with it the loss of even human rights, and this loss is
the tell-tale sign of statelessness.
Only [the stateless people's] past with its "entailed
inheritance" seems to attest to the fact that they belong
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to the civilized world. 48
Far from halting the alienation of the stateless from the
civilized world, naturalistic human rights encouraged it.

These

rights stressed the importance of being part of nature as
opposed to being part of the civilized world.

Practical Weaknesses of Human Rights
But Arendt's critique of natural right and natural rights
is not simply philosophical.

It is practical as well.

Even the

victims of statelessness, she claims, did not rely on human
rights as a defense against statelessness. 49

In addition to

being forced to bear an ambiguous legal status, they themselves
rejected any appeal to the Rights of Man .
. the victims shared the disdain and indifference of
the powers that be for any attempt of the marginal
societies to enforce human rights in any elementary or
general sense. 50
The victims had two interrelated criticisms of the Rights of
Man.
First, the victims observed that a culture need not have a
history or be part of another group's history in order to
qualify for natural rights:
. natural rights are granted even to savages.
"inalienable" rights would confirm only the "right of the
naked savage," and therefore reduce civilized nations to
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the status of savagery. 51
No more did they feel that they deserved to be categorized with
the savages than did they feel that relying on such rights would
bring them any closer to qualifying for citizen rights.

The

mark of savages is that they are "peoples without a history."~
Nations entered the scene of history and were emancipated
when peoples had acquired a consciousness of themselves as
cultural and historical entities, and of their territory as
a permanent home, where history had left its visible traces
. Wherever nation-states came into being, migrations
53
came to an end .
Thus, the liberation of minority nations began with
"philological revivals" to prove the possession of a history and
thereby achieve national recognition and territorial
sovereignty. 54

Purging themselves of a history in order to

qualify for rights as savages was not only insulting, but, based
on their observations of national emancipation in Europe and the
application of Minority treaties, impractical.

Absent national

emancipation, minorities preferred either to assimilate to some
extent to the nationalities governing the state in which they
resided or to create an "inter-state web of solidarity." 55
Second, the stateless saw clearly that the Rights of Man
had historically been linked to nationality, not statehood.
only did these groups observe that the Rights of Man became
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linked to national sovereignty during the French Revolution, but
they also observed the same type of emancipation being sought by
the various national liberation movements in Eastern Europe, 56
untreatied minorities knew that they lived within the
contradiction between national sovereignty and universal rights;
and they knew that appeals to the Rights of Man would be
meaningless, for in practice, the Rights of Man were none other
than the rights of the citizen.
No matter how [human rights] have once been defined (life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, according to the
American formula, or as equality before the law, liberty,
protection of property, and national sovereignty, according
to the French);.
. the real situation of those whom the
twentieth century has driven outside the pale of the law
57
shows that these are rights of citizens .
The distinction between human rights and citizens rights is
clarified when the connection between the Rights of Man and
national sovereignty is examined.
The same essential rights were at once declared as the
inalienable heritage of all human beings and as the
specific heritage of specific nations, the same nation was
at once declared to be subject to [universal] laws, which
supposedly would flow from the Rights of Man, and
sovereign, that is, bound by no universal law and
acknowledging nothing superior to itself. The practical
outcome of this contradiction was that from then on human
rights were protected and enforced only as national rights
58

Once universal human rights were translated into particularistic
positive law, they lost their universal quality.
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the unenfranchised, could not bring their cases to bear on any
positive law because the positive law did not recognize them.
since a state can not be both sovereign and subject at the same
time, the sovereign state could not recognize any law above
itself.

Human rights "proved to be unenforceable -- even in

whose countries those constitutions were based on them -whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any
sovereign state. " 59
Even if it were possible for a single state to
institutionalize universal laws, the minorities of Europe had no
reason, after the negotiations following World War I, to believe
that any of the European nation-states would.
the Rights of Man.

"Never before had

. been a practical political issue,
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and

the untreatied minorities knew from their own experience that
human rights were only called upon by "those who had nothing
better to fall back upon. " 61
Being thus suspect of appeals to nature, untreatied
minorities instead appealed only to their lost nationality as a
means to retrieve their political significance .
. afraid that they might finish by being considered as
beasts, they insisted on their nationality, the last sign
of their former citizenship, as their only remaining and
recognized tie with humanity. 62
Knowing that human rights would not in any way assure them a
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right to take part in history, they appealed to their own
minority nationality as their most potent argument for including
them in the historical processes, in the governing, of Europe.
Even the Eastern European nationalities -- the "people without
history" -- found such a tactic useful. 63
According to Arendt, both philosophically and practically,
human rights were meaningless in the face of statelessness.
Only by tying their fate to formerly held citizen's rights could
the stateless hope to regain their concrete human appearance.
In the end, this hope proved false, but it was at least a
historically realistic hope in comparison to the "fumbling
feeble-minded" idealism that human rights fostered.

The World and Human Diversity
To Arendt, the rise of statelessness represents a new type
of apolitical thinking, based obscurely on natural right but
wholly new.

It is apolitical in that it seeks to destroy those

things upon which politics depends

those things which, like

human action, are mysteriously and unpredictably "given" to
humankind.

The destruction of the given is motivated by a

mistrust of all things that are not created in the human world.
The more at home men feel within the human artifice -- the
more they will resent everything they have not produced,
everything which is merely and mysteriously given to them. 64
The central element of such mistrust is the conflict between
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equality and difference.

Whereas in the world we make ourselves

equal, in nature we each are unique.

The world harbors "a deep

resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact
that each of us is made as he is -- single, unique,
unchangeable.
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For Arendt, the term "equal" has been

incorrectly defined by modernity in one sense to mean
"predictable" or "the same".

Humankind shuns all sources of

unpredictable differentiation in order, it thinks, to assure its
very survival.
The reason why highly developed political communities .
so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to
eliminate as far as possible those natural and always
present differences and differentiations which by
themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust and discrimination
because they indicate all too clearly those spheres where
men cannot act and change at will, i.e., the limitations of
the human artifice. 66
But world survival is not possible through such a means:
. wherever civilization succeeds in eliminating or
reducing to a minimum the dark background of difference, it
will end in petrification and be punished, so to speak, for
having forgotten that man is only the master, but not the
creator of the world. 67
Thus, only by accommodating naturally given differences is it
possible for the world to flourish.
A significant artifact of Arendt's thinking on this point
is that she equates ethnic differentiation with the given.

Not

only are individuals "naturally" unique and therefore part of
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the given, but so are peoples.

It is central to her argument

that "alien" peoples threaten the human artifice to such an
extent that "[humankind] has a distinct tendency to destroy
[them],

1168

because they are part of the given.

Crick clarifies

Arendt's thoughts by stating that persons were actually thought
to be "anti-citizens, corruptive of the society, if they were,
in one instance, of the wrong social class and, in the other
instance, of the wrong race. " 69
Peoples who threaten the human artifice are seen by it as
no less and no more than superfluous to it.

They themselves

belong to a kind of nature, symbolizing the limits to
humankind's capacity to create and fix the human world.

Worse

than other elements of nature, alien peoples threaten to uproot
the political world itself.

Removed from "the normal restraints

of politics" European leaders applied the lessons of imperialism
to Europe. 7 °

For those involved with negotiating the

reorganization of Europe, accepting or including such peoples
would require a radical redirection of politics, which, although
it might in truth be for the good, because its outcome could not
be predicted with precision, needed to be avoided at all costs.
To the extent that the reorganization was preoccupied with
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political stability, any redirection of politics that produced
or permitted instability was viewed as being out of the
question.
Statelessness becomes a possibility wherever individuals
and peoples are thus superfluous to the functioning of the
world.

Once peoples are defined as things belonging to nature,

they become divorced from the human world, incapable of
participating in its history.
If a Negro in a white community is considered a Negro and
nothing else . . . he has become some specimen of an animal
species, called man. Much the same thing happens to those
who have lost all distinctive political qualities and have
become human beings and nothing else. 71
Returning to a "peculiar state of nature,"n the stateless are
stripped of the very qualities that signify their belonging to
the human artifice.
It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the
very qualities which make it possible for other people to
treat him as a fellow-man. 73
What is lost is the ability of the stateless to be seen and
heard, to be recognized as part of the company of humankind, as
a co-author of history; instead, the stateless are thrown back
into nature.
To Arendt, human rights which are defended because of their
inalienable, natural origin can not protect the world from its
desire to "over-manage'' itself.

The priority of stability
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brings with it intolerance for anything given.

Claiming human

rights as a defense against the destructiveness of the world
necessitates no response from the world.

Instead, the world can

only respond to rights that are based on mutual obligation, on
contractual, negotiated settlements, and on fellowship:

on the

unprecedented mutual understanding that can only result from the
process of seeing, being seen by, hearing and being heard by
each other.

Traditionally contrived notions of human rights

have no such qualities or origin.

They are not even part of the

undeniable given; human rights so conceived are not mysteriously
and unpredictably bestowed upon the world.

Arendt suggests that

traditional notions of human rights have followed the same path
as have the Rights of Man.

They "had never been philosophically

established but merely formulated,

[and] had never been

politically secured but merely proclaimed." 74
Peoples who are without a home are better off, according to
Arendt, when they stress their own history of fellowship within
their own community.

This, at least, provides them a political

home and, thus, makes them part of humanity.

Appeals to

inalienable human rights, however, carry with them no
obligation.

According to Arendt, they simply permit the world

to categorize those who claim them as being alien (i.e., of
nature) and, therefore, superfluous to the human artifice.
If traditional concepts of human rights are incapable of
redirecting humankind away from its preoccupation with stability
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and towards a new preoccupation with world survival, then one is
left asking whether any conception of human rights can perform
this task and whether we should do away with the notion of human
rights entirely.
will now turn.

It is to these questions that the discussion

CHAPTER 2
A NEW FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Arendt is clear that the reorganization of Europe following
World War I was a failure because there were no philosophical
constructs or practical applications of human rights that would
prevent individuals and peoples from being expelled from the
political world.

But the events leading to World War II were

not isolated and never to be repeated.

Arendt sees continuing

examples of statelessness (for example, the Palestinians) and is
concerned that statelessness will always be with us.

Far from

being a marginal international phenomenon, Arendt contends that
statelessness is the beginning of the end for civilization. 1
As suggested earlier, the creation of statelessness is an
indication that the human world is beginning to create a new
sphere of nature against which to define itself.

Although the

threat of the Nazis is over for all intents and purposes, other
similar threats may present themselves:
The frightening coincidence of the modern population
explosion with the discovery of technical devices that,
through automation, will make large sections of the
population "superfluous" even in terms of labor, and that,
through nuclear energy, make it possible to deal with this
twofold threat by the use of instruments beside which
Hitler's gassing installations look like an evil child's
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fumbling toys, should be enough to make us trernble. 2
Beyond the issue of statelessness proper, Arendt foresees the
creation of other superfluous groups and classes:
Political, social and economic events everywhere are in a
silent conspiracy with totalitarian instruments devised for
making men superfluous . . . Totalitarian solutions may well
survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of
strong tempations which will come up whenever it seems
impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic
misery in a manner worthy of man. 3
Th furor of anti-communist activity and propaganda in the 1950's
also convinced Arendt that peoples needed a new type of
protection -- even in the United States. 4
Not only does totalitarianism create superfluousness but it
also permits the annihilation of the superfluous.

Arendt hopes

to purge totalitarian solutions from our repertoire of responses
to human turmoil.

She claims that adopting totalitarian

solutions reduces humankind to the level of animals.
The previous chapter detailed Arendt's criticism of notions
of human rights that are derived from the natural right
tradition.

Although she claims that such notions are

politically irrelevant, she also claims that the twentieth
century has taught us lessons that require us to develop a
relevant notion of human rights.
idea is one of her own aims.

Indeed, developing such an

This chapter will begin by
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examining Arendt's philosophical underpinnings to her human
rights theory.

It will end by defining Arendt's three

categories of rights, of which human rights is one.

The Dominance of the Life Process and World Alienation
Arendt claims that the nightmarish invention of
superfluousness was related to the substitution of laboring for
action in the public realm -- both manifestations of world
alienation.

Where humankind had once seen itself as the maker

"of those fixed permanent standards and measurements which,
prior to the modern age, have always served him as guides for
doing and as criteria for his judgment," 5 humankind began to
raise the process-aspect of fabricating over the creation-aspect
of fabrication.

Although both are fundamentally linked, the

absence of the creator signals a disregard for the things of the
world in which previous generations invested themselves: the
value of consumption was raised over the value of durability.
It is not so much that humankind lost the capacity to create but
that it lost the desire to see itself as the fabricator of its
"permanent" world.

As such, it lost the capacity to lay the

foundation for political activity.

This loss demonstrated not

only a distorted understanding of politics but a distorted
understanding of fabrication as well.
Action was soon and still is almost exclusively understood
in terms of making and fabricating, only that making,
because of its worldliness and inherent indifference to
life, was now regarded as but another form of laboring, a
5.
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more complicated but not a more mysterious function of the
life process. 6
Both action and fabrication lost their original meanings.
Because the survival of the human world requires that
durability is a priority, alienation from te world -- as a
durable entity -- accompanies the emphasis on the life process.
"Permanence is entrusted to a flowing process, as distinguished
from a stable structure." 7

The effect of humankind's emphasis

on process, as opposed to action or fabrication, demonstrates
that humankind no longer saw itself and its world as distinct
from nature, but rather as fused with it .
. man began to consider himself part and parcel of the
two superhuman, all-encompassing processes of nature and
history, both of which seemed doomed to an infinite
progress without ever reaching any inherent telos or
approaching any pre-ordained idea. 8
Instead, humankind is distinct from the world it made -alienated from it.

The loss of the world "has left behind it a

society of men, who without a common world which would at once
relate and separate them, live either in desperate lonely
separation or are pressed together in a mass." 9

Even history

itself, which had once been the catalogue of humankind's
creation of the world -- a recollection of humankind's stand
against the unpredictable and arbitrary forces of nature -- now

6.

Arendt, The Human Condition, 322.

7.
Arendt, "History and Immortality," Partisan Review 24
(1957): 21.
8.

Arendt, The Human Condition, 307.

9.

Arendt, "History and Immortality," 35.

41
became the result of "inevitable" forces that were driven by the
nature of humankind.

Indeed, "Milton was considered to have

written his Paradise Lost for the same reasons and out of
similar urges that compel the silkworm to produce silk. " 10
World alienation's most profound manifestation is
consumerism.

Where once the world consisted "not of things that

were consumed but of things that were used" 11 ,

consumerism has

turned the world into a trading station for solely consumable
and, therefore, temporary goods.

In order to continue the life

process, "things must be almost as quickly devoured and
discarded as they have appeared in the world. " 12

Thus, where the

world at one time represented humankind's effort to extend
himself into future generations, i.e., the closest approximation
to permanency that humankind can achieve, consumerism
demonstrates humankind's effort to devour the world and
everything in it.

For unless the animal laborans keeps

consuming, it will not survive.

Ultimately, consumerism results

in an anti-human society:
. without being at home in the midst of things whose
durability makes them fit for use and for erecting a world
whose very permanence stands in direct contrast to [mortal]
life, this life would never be human. 13
The anti-humanness of human society ends politics, for politics
can only survive where necessity does not exist.
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But alienation from the world is only one symptom of the
rise of consumerism.

Arendt holds that humankind has turned

toward consumption to such a degree that it consumes far beyond
its need and is aimed at things which humankind has always
valued for reasons other than need (i.e., politics):
consumption is no longer restricted to the
necessities but, on the contrary, mainly concentrates on
the superfluities of life,
[and] harbors the grave
danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe
from consumption and annihilation through consumption. 14
Thus, the public sphere was at one time cleared away as a space
in which human beings could be free from the necessity of
consumption.
public realm.

Today, however, the animal laborans rules the
In doing so, it makes everything -- not just what

were once use-objects -- in the world essentially temporary,
unstable and vulnerable to consumption.

Ultimately, destruction

extends to humankind itself, for through totalitarian regimes,
consumerism "destroy(s) every trace of what we commonly call
human dignity." 15

Things that were once valued solely for the

fact that they were not related to the necessities of life
become superfluous: these things which were valued by politics,
such as ethnic diversity, also become superfluous and therefore
consumable.
The most clear example of Arendt's view that the rise of
superfluousness and worldlessness are a corollaries of
consumerism begins with the expropriation of the peasantry
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during the late middle ages -- a process that would be repeated
with the creation of statelessness in postwar Germany.

The

expropriation of the peasantry, she argues, is the single most
important factor leading to the dissolution of feudalism. 16
Expropriation, the deprivation for certain groups [the
peasantry] of their place in the world and their naked
exposure to the exigencies of life, created both the
original accumulation of wealth and the possibility of
transforming this wealth into capital through labor . .
The new laboring class . . . stood not only directly under
the compelling urgency of life's necessity but was at the
same time alienated from all cares and worries which did
not immediately follow from the life process itself. 17
The necessary preoccupation with the life process, in turn,
robbed the laborers of their capacity to participate in both the
public and the private spheres.

In fact, the loss of the

private share in the world led to the destruction of the public
sphere as well. 18

The boundaries between the public and the

private did not merely shift.

They were erased, hence

destroying both spheres simultaneously.
The "economic miracle" that Germany displayed during the
postwar period was nothing more than a highly technological
version of expropriation, claims Arendt.

Germany's experience

showed that not only could the public and private realms be
destroyed, but human life itself could be destroyed once the
process of expropriation was unleashed from its technological
barriers.
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The German example shows very clearly that under modern
conditions the expropriation of the people, the destruction
of objects, and the devastation of cities will turn out to
be a radical stimulant for a process, not of mere recovery,
but of quicker and more efficient accumulation of wealth.
Such a rapidly accelerating process for the accumulation of
wealth requires the transformation of all things that might be
lasting and that might contribute to the durable construction of
the human world into consumables .
. a booming prosperity which, as postwar Germany
illustrates, feeds not on the abundance of material goods
or on anything stable and given but on the process of
production and consumption itself. 19
Thus, consumerism dominated postwar Germany because it was able
to feed the accumulation of wealth.

Any attempt to stop the

process of consumerism would end in stagnating the economy,
which came to depend on the sheer transience of goods.
Under modern conditions, not destruction but conservation
spells ruin because the very durability of conserved
objects is the greatest impediment to the turnover
process, whose constant gain in speed is the only constancy
left wherever it has taken hold. 20
The fragility of the relationship between production and
durability was overturned.

The only "constancy" remaining was

the process of consumption itself; the only stability was
instability.

The relationship between the dominance of

consumerism and the rise of statelessness now begins to surface.
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The Effect of Worldlessness on the Human Status
The destruction of the opposite realms of the human world
(the public and the private) and the concomitant turning away
from durability is similarly related to the rise of the nationstate.

It is here that we get to the heart of what will become

the foundation of Arendt's defense of human rights.

Where at

one time the stability of one's physical place in the world
guaranteed a private place to which the family could retreat,
the dominance of animal laborans assured that the privateness of
the family would disappear.
be replaced directly.

The privacy of the family could not

The "old" family was related by biology,

and it was replaced by the "new" family which was also related
by

biology -- race:
. . . just as the family unit had been identified with a
privately owned piece of the world, its property, society
was identified with a tangible, albeit collectively owned,
piece of property, the territory of the nation-state. 21

Through the nation-state structure, the nation that claimed a
territory of its own was able to fix for itself some sense of
privacy and permanence, however imperilled.
In this way, the nation-state represents an attempt to
replace what was lost through the process of expropriation
the loss of the common public world as the basis for human
action and the loss of the private share of the world are
mitigated with the gain of a common, single ancestry.

The

function of the nation-state, then, is to re-relate citizens to
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each other "as family" and to create a new commonality.
The organic theories of nationalism, especially in its
Central European version, all rest on an identification of
the nation and the relationships between its members with
the family and family relationships. 22
The familial connection within the nation-state was the center,
then, of arguments against intra-state racial integration of any
type.

"Homogeneity of population and its rootedness in the soil

of a given territory became the requisites for the nation-state
everywhere. " 23
Taken to its extreme, such as was the case in Germany, the
ethnic character of the nation-state provided a volatile
resolution to world alienation.

The very fact that the

resolution was restricted to nationals and that it ignored the
extant ethnic heterogeneity exasperated the lack of commonality
among the inhabitants of the territory.

The driving force of

the conflict between the nationals and the minorities (soon to
become the stateless), hence, was the nation-state itself.

In

addition, the nation-state did not actually resolve world
alienation for the nationals.

The emphasis on biology robbed

the nationals of their unique political history.

Like the

stateless, the nationals had nothing more than their "abstract
[biological] humanness" to support their claim to immortality.
The only difference between the nationals and the stateless was
the extent to which they had the technological means to exclude

22.

Ibid., 256.

23.

Ibid., 256.

47
the other from what was left of their common world.
The danger of such a social system is furthered, according
to Arendt, once the system is internationalized through the
processes of colonization and imperialism.

The danger becomes

tangible when all of the territory on the face of the earth is
politically accounted for.
Just as the family and its property were replaced by class
membership and national territory, so mankind now begins to
replace nationally bound societies, and the earth replaces
limited state territory. 24
As seen earlier, the colonization of the entire earth means that
to be excluded from one political entity means being excluded
from them all.

When citizenship is seen as being biologically

derived, to lose one's citizenship is the same thing as being
excluded from the human race itself.
The result of the victory of animal laborans is that
peoples become superfluous because they "begin to belong to the
human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific
animal species." 25

For Arendt, human beings ought to be

characterized by their capacity to "communicate [themselves] and
not merely something -- thirst, hunger, affection or hostility
or fear." 26
human.

Making human beings superfluous recasts them as non-

The animal laborans is not interested in speaking and

acting, but rather in consuming.

Thus, the society overtaken by
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the animal laborans expresses only its thirst and hunger in what
once was the public realm and it makes it an unfit place for
human action.
Earlier, it was mentioned that stateless peoples during the
reorganization of Europe that followed World War I were likely
to begin their public claims for national rights by reawakening
their ethnic language and culture.

For Arendt, this is a

significant piece of evidence on two levels.

First, it

demonstrates stateless peoples' need to tie themselves to worldmaking by displaying their past role in world-making.

Second,

philological revivals in particular demonstrated these peoples'
political, as opposed to biological, humanness.

The very

existence of language testifies to the fact that the individuals
within the stateless groups were accustomed to revealing
themselves politically, through speech.

It is the commonality

of the experience of self-revelation, Arendt would argue, that
the stateless peoples desired to communicate to the majority
nationalities.

By doing so, they hoped to demonstrate that they

were politically, as well as biologically, human.
If speech and action become meaningless, it becomes clear
how, once peoples are redefined as expendable, no rights can be
proclaimed that have the power to re-insert them into the human
world.

Naturalistic human rights attributed to superfluous

peoples, for example as were claimed for the stateless, sound
like the rights invoked by "anti-cruelty to animals societies," 27
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because the stateless are superfluous -- they have become
defined as animals instead of as humans.

Thus, any rights they

claim can only refer to their biological sameness with peoples
and persons who possess the rights of citizens.

Political

qualities of stateless individuals can not be seen once
humankind is dominated by the animal laborans.

Human rights,

traditionally conceived, do not have the power to create a
platform for speech and action.

Any successful attempt to re-

insert the stateless must carry with it the capacity to clear
away such a platform.

Three Categories of Rights
Arendt repeatedly reminds us that "men, not man, inhabit
the earth."

As such, it is plain that "good" politics must be

based upon the concepts of plurality and diversity.

"Rights

exist only because of the plurality of men, because we inhabit
the earth together with other men.

n28

Thus, if human rights

can be argued to be politically relevant, they must have the
capacity to safeguard humankind from its own capacity to
extinguish diversity, to turn parts of itself back into nature,
from "[throwing persons] back

on their own

differentiation, " 29 and from casting human beings as mere
animals.
In order to be what the world is always meant to be, a home
for men during their life on earth, the human artifice must
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be a place fit for action and speech, for activities not
only entirely useless for the necessities of life but of an
entirely different nature from the manifold activities of
fabrication by which the world itself and all things in it
are produced. 30
·
It is no less than this world -- a home from which no human
being can possibly be excluded

that Arendt hopes to regain

and protect through a new look at human rights.
Arendt distinguishes between three types of rights:
political and human.

civil,

Instead of relying on the natural right

tradition, Arendt finds that the political necessity for these
rights can be discovered in humankind's own political
experience.
Civil rights, according to Arendt, are "all of a negative
character." 31

Building upon her distinction between liberty, to

be released from oppression, and freedom, to act politically,
Arendt further identifies liberty with rights that permit
citizens to have control over their environment, a negative
component of political influence.

Freedom, on the other hand,

is identified with rights which give citizens the power to act,
a positive component of political influence. 32

Thus, the

category of civil rights includes those rights which both
liberate the individual from and control the advent of tyranny,
such as the rights to vote and to be represented.

These rights

"claim not a share in government but a safeguard against
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government." 33

Fundamentally, they limit the potential of

government by assuring that it is law-abiding.
Civil rights are essentially individualistic in character
and have their roots in the notion of private happiness, which
locates true happiness "in the privacy of a home upon whose life
the public has not claim."N

The presupposition of this

happiness is that no joy can honorably be found in public
activity.

Governmental figures and participants are "not

supposed to be happy but to labour under a burden." 35

Anyone

preferring a public life is suspect of possessing greed for
power and such rulership would necessarily result in despotism. 36
Thus, Arendt contends that civil rights are anti-political in
that they draw the individual away from the public realm.
As opposed to civil rights, political rights rest on the
discovery of public happiness, on the presupposition that only
in public is true happiness attainable.

Even before the

American Revolution began, for example, the experience of selfgovernment convinced the would-be revolutionaries that "they
could not be altogether 'happy' if their happiness was located
and enjoyed only in private life. " 37

Political rights permit the

individual to be an agent of politics, to be a participant; they
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allow the citizen who so desired to "(lay) claim to a share in
public power. " 38
Specifically, this category of rights includes the rights
to speak and assemble, the two rights which correlate most
closely with the self-disclosure that is the necessity of the
vita activa. 39

By being heard and seen in public, the individual

is "inserted into the human world, and this insertion is like a
second birth. " 40

Only by becoming part of the human world is it

possible for a person to be seen as both truly unique from all
others and truly equal to all others.

The co-experience of

distinction and equality is the "actualization of the human
condition of plurality." 41

Plurality, then, is the experience

that is provided by political rights and that results in public
happiness.
Arendt contends that once they had discovered political
rights, the revolutionaries of America and France were too
entranced by this new form of happiness to be satisfied with
merely civil, protective rights.
The men of the revolution .
[preferred] under almost
any circumstances -- should the alternatives unhappily be
put to them in such terms -- public freedom to civil
liberties or public happiness to private welfare." 42
They preferred to discard protection altogether than to deprive
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themselves of the opportunity for public self-disclosure -- a
deprivation that would result in them living the rest of their
lives in the unreality of isolation, what they once thought of
as "private happiness".
Unlike civil rights, which are essentially individualistic,
political rights belong to the individual but protect more than
just the individual.

A benevolent tyrant can grant civil

rights, for example, but Arendt contends that he or she can not
grant political rights.
Tyranny, as the revolutionaries came to understand it, was
a form of government in which the ruler, even though he
ruled according to the laws of the realm, had monopolized
for himself the right of action, banished the citizens from
the public realm into the privacy of their households, and
demanded of them that they mind their own, private
business. Tyranny, in other words, deprived of public
43
happiness, though not necessarily private well-being.
Political rights protect the public world from the invasion of
this particular form of tyranny.

Arendt's last category of rights is her most novel
contribution to rights theory.

Where her defense of civil and

political rights requires her to harken back to Roman and Greek
political experiences, her defense of human rights stems solely
from her own observations of the unprecedented political events
of the twentieth century.

Thus, while she uses the term "human

rights", she drops from that term any meaning insinuated by its
historical relation to natural right.
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concerned, the necessity for any rights described as "human" did
not surface until this century; thus she defines the term in a
wholly new way, without reference at all to its historical
usage.
Since the most important political event of this century
was the invention of superfluousness, the content of human
rights, according to Arendt, can be discovered only by
discovering what things were stripped from persons and peoples
in Europe following World War I that allowed them to become
superfluous and, eventually, allowed them to be liquidated. 44
Arendt contends that two rights were taken from them and that,
again, neither of the rights had ever been considered rights
before.
First, the stateless were stripped of their homes, their
places in the world which made their words and actions relevant
to others. 45

Second, the stateless were stripped of the right to

have rights, not only in their home nation but in all nations. 46
Under no regime and in no nation-state were they given legal
status:

they belonged nowhere.

Arendt goes so far as to

suggest that slaves' and criminals' human rights are not
violated because they have both places in the world, although
perhaps no freedom of movement, and legal status, although no
political power.

However, the stateless were deprived of both:
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in the welter of rights of the most heterogenous
nature and origin, we are only too likely to overlook and
neglect the one right without which no others can
materialize -- the right to belong to a political
community. 47
Thus, human rights, if they exist at all, must assure that
individuals, in fact, belong to the human world and that they
are recognized as belonging by all states.
The fact that superfluous persons and peoples belong no
where -- that they are homeless -- is proof, to Arendt, that
they are driven from the world by the effects of world
alienation.

The destruction and self-destruction inherent in

rise of the animal laborans is ultimately played out through
totalitarian thinking.

Therefore, human rights must resolve the

world alienation born by superfluous, or potentially
superfluous, peoples and the groups that make them so.
Where societies are structured around necessity, such a
resolution can not occur.

Since politics requires freedom from

necessity, human rights must protect a realm in which activities
will not be driven by biological processes.

Kateb summarizes

her thought when he states that "groups of people must be at
home in the world if the frame of memorable deeds, the frame of
political action, is to be secured and strengthened." 48
must lend permanence to the world.

They

Thus, human rights must

force peoples and individuals to view each other as politically,
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not just biologically, human.
Arendt's category of human rights differs fundamentally
from civil and political rights in that it is intended, not to
protect the individual or any particular public space.

Instead,

it protectsthe human world itself by clearing away a public
space above, not just between, and within states.
[The stateless'] ever-increasing numbers threaten our
political life, our human artifice, in much the same,
perhaps even more terrifying, way as wild nature once
threatened the existence of man-made cities. Deadly danger
to civilization is no longer likely to come from without .
. the emergence of totalitarian governments is a phenomenon
within, not outside, our civilization. 49
Thus, any protection human rights provide the individual or
particular governments is incidental to its primary function of
protecting civilization as a whole.

While the ultimate aim is

to restore human dignity, Arendt holds that no such restoration
is possible without the fundamental restoration of the
"permanent" human world.
As mentioned earlier, Arendt classifies ethnic
differentiation among the types of individual uniqueness that
originate in nature.

Fundamental, then, to safeguarding persons

and peoples from being excluded or liquidated because of their
ethnic diversity are human rights.
For man has only one right that transcends his various
rights as a citizen: the right never to be excluded from
the rights granted by his community (an exclusion which
occurs not when he is put in jail, but when he is put in a
concentration camp) and never to be deprived of his
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citizenship. 50
This right, according to Arendt, has the capacity to halt the
rule of animal laborans and require that the public realm either
be a place for politics or remain vacant.

The right to not be

excluded, however, is not precisely the same as the right to
belong.

Where belonging implies participation and a certain

degree of "welcomeness", the right not to be excluded implies
merely the right not to be tossed away, leaving no trace with
which historians could detect one's existence.

Thus, her

practical foundation for human rights is very specific
rise of superfluousness.

the

And her concern here is only with

saving the fabricated world -- not with free expression or
expanded privacy.
In summary, Arendt contends that human rights are necessary
to safe-guard the human-made world and, with it, the fact of
human diversity and the human condition of plurality upon which
politics is based.

Because one of Arendt's most harsh

criticisms of natural rights is that their inapplicability
borders on the utopian, it is crucial that she show how her
notion of human rights can be implemented.

Thus, the next

chapter will describe what crimes offend human rights and what
types of political or legal institutions can offer an effective
deterrent to these crimes.
of the Adolf Eichmann trial.

We begin by looking at her account
In this account, Arendt clarifies

what is meant by the term "crimes against humanity" and
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struggles with how human rights can become politically
compelling in the international arena.

CHAPTER 3
INSTITUTIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS

As noted earlier, because of the nature of her criticisms
of traditional concepts of human rights, it is especially
important for Arendt to demonstrate the feasibility of
implementing her own vision of human rights -- to prove that
they are politically compelling.

However, after diagnosing the

problems of human rights and prescribing a new vision of them,
Arendt never directly described her vision of the political and
legal institutions required to implement them in a comprehensive
manner.

Indeed, most political theorists lay vulnerable to

sharp criticism in the area of implementation.
Perhaps, Arendt's failure was due primarily to her being
disappointed by the precedents set by the World War II war
crimes trials.

It appears clear from her writings on the

Eichmann trial that she believed that the chance for crucial
legal and political reforms in the international arena was
simply passed over.

The methods employed in bringing Eichmann

to "justice" were wholly inadequate, although perhaps
justifiable.

Because of the unprecedentedness of Germany's

actions and because of the consensus condemning Hitler, for the
first time in history, a stage was cleared in the international
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arena for equally unprecedented action which could confirm and
implement a viable human rights theory.
opportunity to act.

But no one took the

The fact that she, for all intents and·

purposes, never again directly addressed the issue of human
rights after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem lends some
credence to this hypothesis.

In addition, Eichmann's behavior

during the trial shocked Arendt in the extreme.

Her

preoccupation with crimes against humanity changed its focus
from political structure to the relation between thought, action
and responsibility.

Thus, she turned to a study of obligation

that eventually evolved into her final, but incomplete, work The
Life of the Mind. 1
Be that as it may, Arendt leaves us a couple of trails to
follow which can be thought of as routes to the definition for
her concept of human rights.

First, she comprehensively

criticizes both the legal system that was invented to respond to
the atrocities committed by Germany prior to and during the
Second World War, and the political structures that made Germany
vulnerable to performing such deeds and that held the rest of
Europe captive to it.

Second, many of her remarks that

accompany these criticisms indicate the direction in which her
prescription for implementation might go.

Unfortunately, she

frequently contradicts herself or is so vague that her position
-- beyond its very general components -- can not be deciphered
with any precision.

1.
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the legal and political structures will be dealt with as fully
as possibl, along with her less comprehensive criticisms of
prescriptions which were put forth by other theorists.

The ·1ast

two sections of the chapter will summarize the seeds of what
might have been Arendt's plan for implementation.

The Appearance of Crimes Against Humanity
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt discusses, first, what was
unprecedented about the rise and extermination of the stateless
and, second, what has been done politically and legally in order
to prevent these events from occurring once again.

Her motive

for looking to legal processes which have the capacity to halt
crimes against humanity rests on the presupposition "that the
unprecedented, once it has appeared, may become a precedent in
the future." 2
Clearly and somewhat superficially, one thing that was new
about the rise of statelessness was that it required a new
category of criminal code:

crimes against humanity.

To place

this new category in historical perspective, Arendt classifies
each of the crimes of the Nazis.

The first crime was the

legalization of discrimination within Germany.

This crime was

institutionalized in the Nuremberg Laws which created a second
class of citizenship to which Jews irreversibly and
automatically belonged.

The Nuremberg Laws "violated national,

constitutional rights and liberties, but [they] were of no
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concern to the comity of nations." 3

While it might be said that

this set of crimes denied Jews political rights and severely
limited their civil rights, it can not be said to have offended
their human rights which were not violated until the Jews were
actually deprived of their citizenship.
The second crime that the Nazis committed was an
international one -- officially termed "enforced emigration".
Expulsion . . . [concerned] the international community,
for the simple reason that those who were expelled appeared
at the frontiers of other countries, which were forced
either to accept the uninvited guests or to smuggle them
into another country . . . 4
Forcing persons into another country's territory is an act of
aggression between two nations.

Any legal recourse that

nations, peoples or persons have is limited to agreements and
treaties that are negotiated between, not above, nations.

Thus,

although the rootlessness in which this crime resulted appeared
to be an offense against human rights, the crime had no direct
relation to the rights of persons or peoples but merely to the
rights of nations.

Only international law was violated.

Even

though persons were deprived of their homes by the Nazis, this
deprivation alone was not an offense against human rights,
according to Arendt.

It is not the deprivation of a home itself

that the stateless experienced but the impossibility of finding
a new one.

The fact that the states into which the stateless

were imported did not welcome them was a crime against humanity.
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However, this crime was not committed by the Nazis.
The final crime that the Nazis perpetrated was the
extermination of "the Jews and the people of several other
nations."

Extermination was not limited to German Jews but was

aimed at "[making] the entire Jewish people disappear from the
face of the earth." 5

Whereas expulsion is a crime against other

nations, genocide "is an attack upon human diversity as such,
that is, upon a characteristic of the 'human status' without
which the very words 'mankind' or 'humanity' would be void of
meaning.

116

This last crime offends human rights on two counts.

In

order to exterminate the Jews, the Nazis had to strip them of
their citizenship and turn them into a stateless people.

This,

ironically, was how Israel justified kidnapping and trying
Eichmann.
It was Eichmann's de facto statelessness, and nothing else,
that enabled the Jerusalem court to sit in judgement on
him. Eichmann, though no legal expert, should have been
able to appreciate that, for he knew from his own career
that one could do as one pleased with stateless people; the
Jews had had to lose their nationality before they could be
exterminated. 7
As mentioned above, because other states did not welcome the
Jews into their borders, the Jews became stateless.

Once done,

the Nazis would not be held responsible for their fate.
The creation of the person-category called stateless,
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however, did not itself necessarily result in the limitation or
extermination of human diversity.
really two crimes. 8

The crime against humanity is

By excluding a people from the public

sphere and deeming them stateless, the Nazis terminated the
human condition of plurality -- the first offense against human
rights.

The termination of plurality, as mentioned above, was

necessary before "one could do as one pleased with [the Jews]."
Once the Jews held the non-status of stateless, the very
fact of human diversity could be erased.

The act of genocide

the second offense against human rights -- sought to terminate
the human diversity upon which the human condition of plurality
is grounded:
... [genocide] is an attack upon human diversity as such,
that is, upon a characteristic of the "human status"
without which the very words "mankind" or "humanity" would
be devoid of meaning. 9
In other words, Arendt suggests that, since plurality is
dependent on diversity, the elimination of plurality (political
equality) must precede the elimination of diversity (natural
differentiation).

The first is a crime against humanity because

persons or peoples are deprived of their political homes which
make their actions and speech meaningful.

The stateless were

transformed into non-humans and cast out into "a peculiar state
of nature."

The second is a crime against humanity because its

aim is to fundamentally change what it means to be human -- that
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is, diverse in nature and plural in the polis.

While the

elimination of plurality divests peoples or persons of their
human identity, the second divests humanity itself of its human
identity.

Note that no where does Arendt suggest that the

individual qua individual has been violated. 10

International Legal Deterrents
Once crimes against humanity became possible it also became
conceivable that they would become precedents for a multitude of
other attempts to erase the fact of human diversity.

Arendt

holds that "once a specific crime has appeared for the first
time, its reappearance is more likely than its initial emergence
could ever have been." 11

Such a crime can be deterred by way of

an equally unprecedented legal process or political action.
If genocide is an actual possibility of the future, then no
people on earth . . . can feel reasonably sure of its
continued existence without the protection of international
law. 12
Arendt criticizes the legal proceedings against Eichmann because
they did not set this precedent.
Although the Jerusalem court that sat in judgement over
Eichmann was capable of trying crimes against the Jewish people,
it was wholly incapable of trying crimes in which "the
international order, and mankind in its entirely, might have
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been grievously hurt and endangered." 13

In addition to the fact

that it was not capable of creating the type of unprecedented
legal process that the crime against humanity required as a
deterrent, the Israeli court, like the Nuremberg and the
Successor courts, was stricken with "extreme reluctance ... to
break fresh ground and act without precedents." 14

The Israeli

court, however, was especially reluctant to break precedent
because the Jews generally were unable to recognize the
unprecedented nature of the crime against them.

Instead, they

saw it as merely the most recent and grievous crime committed by
the Nazis against the Jews. 15

Thus, they saw no qualitative

break between the legalization of discrimination and genocide,
although Arendt clearly does, as discussed above.

Admitting

that Israel had few options under the circumstances, Arendt is
concerned that the opportunity was lost to set an international
legal precedent that would be enacted above, not just between,
nations.
It is unclear from Eichmann in Jerusalem, though, whether
Arendt sees any court system -- international

or otherwise

as having the capacity to set this legal precedent:
. in consequence of this yet unfinished nature of
international law, it has become the task of ordinary trial
judges to render justice without the help of.
positive, posited laws. For the judge, this may be a
predicament, and he is only too likely to protest that the
"single act" demanded of him is not his to perform but is

13.
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the business of the legislator .
. It must be admitted furthermore that [the failures
of the Jerusalem court] were neither in kind or in degree
greater than the failures of the Nuremberg Trials or the
Successor trials in other European countries. 16
Thus, while much of the volume is dedicated to criticizing the
Jerusalem court and its methods of bringing Eichmann to justice,
Arendt indicates that the Jerusalem court, as well as the
Nuremberg court, was doomed to failure because the nature of
courts is to interpret the pre-existing law for individual cases
not to create law, unprecedented or otherwise.
A call for positive law to deter the perpetration of crimes
against humanity is not made in Eichmann, except indirectly as
in the passage quoted above.

The implications of Arendt's

dissatisfaction with a legal -- as opposed to a political -remedy to crimes against humanity are far-reaching.

For a

fuller treatment of them, we must return to Arendt's critique of
the nation-state system.

The Personification of the State
As mentioned in the first chapter, Arendt's criticism of
traditional human rights can not be articulated without mention
of her criticism of the nation-state.

Through this latter

criticism, she evolves a response to the inadequacies of the
nation-state system as the steward of human rights.
The most fundamental loss that the rise of nationalism has
presented is the loss of universality.

16.

Ibid., 274.
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days of Rome, Arendt believes, civilization was structured
around universal political values, the rise of the nation
represents the development of particular, contingent authority.
One of the main phenomena of the modern world is that
civilization has renounced its old claim to universality
and presents itself in the form of a particular, national
civilization. 17
The loss of universal authority needs to be dealt with directly,
claims Arendt, for if any idea of human rights is to carry a
universal quality, a universal authority must exist.

However,

after further examination, it becomes clear that Arendt does not
think that a new universal authority needs to be framed
perhaps such an authority can not be framed at all.

Rather, she

suggests that all contingent forms of authority be subject
merely to the rule of impartial law.

If substantive universal

values have been lost, perhaps law can at least refrain from
promoting one set of values over another.
Arendt recognizes the difficulty in laws that prefer one
set of ideals over another.

In doing so, she recognizes the

uniqueness of each nation and its right to retain its way of
life.

Instead of requiring all nations to sacrifice their

uniqueness to the state, Arendt regards the importance of
nations' uniqueness as worth preserving because, from it,
springs a people's history.
A people becomes a nation when "it takes conscience of
itself according to its history"; as such it is attached to
the soil which is the product of past labor and where
17. Arendt, "The Nation," Review of Politics 8 (1946): 138.
review of J.T. Delos, La Nation. Montreal: Editions de
l' Arbre.)

(A
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history has left its traces.
It represents the "milieu"
into which man is born, a closed society to which one
belongs by right of birth. 18
Arendt contends that the nation is the place of belonging, the
center of meaning for new lives.

Because it is a closed

society, it is to some extent a private place into which
individuals retreat in order to form their own identities.
However, it is public, in that it holds its own history, which
is its story about its foundation and continued survival in the
world.

Thus, the nation is essentially a geographically stable,

closed entity.
Arendt juxtaposes the idea of the nation with the idea of
the state, an organization with completely different functions
and purposes.
The state on the other hand is an open society, ruling over
a territory where its power protects and makes the law. As
a legal institution, the state knows only citizens no
matter of what nationality; its legal order is open to all
who live on its territory. 19
The state is truly and only public.

While it affords persons

and peoples a private sphere, it and all of its components are
completely exposed.

Where the nation is exclusive, the state is

inclusive with porous boundaries through which all types of
persons, peoples and territories may pass.
Thus, an important difference between the nation and the
state is the permanence of its place in the world and its
structure.

18.

Ibid., 139.

19.
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As a power-institution, the state may claim more territory.
[however, the nation] has put an end to migrations. 20
Where the nation's boundaries are necessarily permanent -- set
by the nation's historical tie to a particular parcel of land
the state's boundaries are temporary, always subject to the
strength of its drive for additional territory.
The distinction between nation and state having been made
clear, Arendt holds that the troubles of modern Europe center
around the confusion of this distinction in practice.
Nationalism signifies essentially the conquest of the state
through the nation. 21
Nationalism occurs when the state is owned or dominated by one
nation.

When this occurs, the state takes on the character of

the nation while retaining parts of the character of the state.
What it loses is its impartiality.

For example, in the nation-

state system, the Rights of Man are construed as the rights of
nationals, thus being exclusive, not inclusive, rights.
The result of XIX century identification of nation and
state is twofold: while the state as a legal institution
has declared and must protect the rights of men, its
identification with the nation implied the identification
of the national and the citizen and thereby resulted in the
confusion of the Rights of Men with the rights of nationals
or with national rights. 22
What the nation gains is military strength.

Armed with the

power-advancing goals of the state, the nation-state takes on
the identity of the nation.

20.

Ibid., 139.

21.

Ibid., 139.

22.
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aggressors for increased territory.
Furthermore, insofar as the state is an "enterprise of
power," aggressive and inclining to expansion, the nation
through its identification with the state acquires all
these qualities and claims expansions now as a national
23
right
Such expansionism, however, loses the impartial, porous
complexion that it bore in the hands of the state.
Thus, the nation, not accustomed to being subject to any
higher authority -- since universal authority was lost with
universal civilization -- became sovereign.

Not permitting

itself to be subject to any universal authority, not admitting
any limit to its power, and not requiring a public sphere in
which "power can be checked by power" -- because the nationstate is essentially a private construction -- the nation-state
was freed to pursue totalitarian goals.
The conquest of the state through the nation started with
the declaration of the sovereignty of the nation.
This was
the first step transforming the state into an instrument of
the nation which finally has ended in
. totalitarian
forms of nationalism . . . It is the nation which has
usurped the traditional place of God and religion. 24
The zeal and absolutism which characterized the nation-states'
quest for power could not be checked by any domestic pressure,
for the nation-states did not represent a plurality but a single
people.

Thus, there were no spaces within the nation-states

which were cleared away for the exercising of political power.
Since only power can balance power, the power of the nation-

23.

Ibid., 139.

24.
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state, with no interior balance, was left unchecked.
In addition, the inability of international sources of
power to limit the aggression inherent in the nation-state was
due to the lense through which the nation-state was viewed -- it
was not perceived as a plural entity:
. . . the sovereignty of the nation was shaped after the
model of the sovereignty of the individual . . . The state
conquered by the nation became the supreme individual
before which all other individuals had to bow.
This is the personification of the state, achieved through
its conquest by the nation and shaped after the model of
the autonomous individual, which first brought into
existence that "individualization of the moral universal
within a collective," . . . 25
The nation-state's rights and duties were based upon nothing
other than individual rights and duties.

Other states spoke of

Germany's rights just like they spoke of the rights of a single
person.

Within the nation-state structure, as with the

individual, only private interests were articulated -- not
public ones.

The loss of commonality between a multiplicity of

private interests, which had at one time been the nadir of the
public realm, had been replaced by one, singular, national,
private, "familial" interest.

In its most extreme form, the

completely privatized public sphere chooses its own aspect.
Like the nation, only now with no limits, the nation-state was
one creature, not a conglomeration of many persons and peoples
and it was treated as such by other international powers.

With

this new capacity, it was freed from every restraint to which a
state is subject.

25.

Ibid., 140.
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This is the way in which nationalism becomes fascism:
the
"Nation-State" transforms or rather personifies itself into
the totalitarian state. 26
As one person, the nation-state takes on a character that is
defined by itself or by one person or by one set of ideas, no
matter how disputable.

No plurality or standard of even logic

restrains it.
But Arendt elucidates these extremes of the nation-state
not simply to repeatedly condemn the totalitarian forms of
government so far evidenced.

Rather, she points to the fact

that totalitarianism is nested within the nation-state's
political structure itself.

No matter how benign any particular

nation-state may seem to be, the structure of the nation-state
itself masks what might be thought of as "latent" totalitarian
movements.
There is little doubt that civilization will be lost if
after destroying the first forms of totalitarianism we do
not succeed in solving the basic problems of our political
structures. 27
Thus, in order to end the possibility of totalitarianism, Arendt
holds that our current political structures must be radically
altered.

International Political Deterrents
In the first chapter, Arendt's defense of Burke's criticism
of the Rights of Man was described.

26.
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27.
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think that Arendt presumes that Burke's response to the events
of the eighteenth century is sufficient for the events of the
twentieth century.

The fundamental limitation of Burke's

critique is that it preserves the nation-state system in Europe,
which Arendt claims has been shown to be inherently flawed.
Like Burke, Arendt is concerned that civilization is at a
turning-point.

Burke feared that the end of English

civilization would occur if English politics was invaded by
French notions of the "universal" Rights of Man.

Arendt fears

that the end of all of civilization will occur if the nationstate can not admit a political authority higher than itself. 28
Burke's response is insufficient for Arendt because the
twentieth century has taught us things that Burke could not have
possibly known.
First, Burke's response to the French Revolution is
insufficient to combat totalitarianism because it does not take
account of the new, global nature of politics.

This critique of

Burke rests on the fact that he presupposes that there is a
multitude of political communities from which rights can spring.
While this presupposition was not unwarranted when he wrote,
according to Arendt, it is obsolete now.

Arendt agrees with

Burke that rights can only be established within a political
community -- they can not be pressed upon it from outside, as
was attempted in the French Revolution. 29

However, she also
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acknowledges that Burke's reference to a "given political
community" implies variability of community and that now, in the
twentieth century, there is only one political community, One
World. 30

Thus, the "common world" from which the stateless are

alienated is the singular, global world of humankind.
The result of the globalization of politics is that a type
of universality is forced upon rights that are established
within this global political community.

In other words, if

rights spring from the political community and if there is only
one such community, then, logically, rights take on a universal,
though perhaps not absolute, quality.
This brings us to Arendt's second critique -- that the
events of this century make universal rights a necessity for the
preservation of humanity.

What Arendt contributes is not an

appeal to the rights of Englishmen, nor an appeal to a higher
order, but something in between these two extremes.
But we also know that apart from all so-called [e.g.,
traditionally contrived notions of] human rights, which
change according to historical and other circumstances,
there does exist one right that does not "spring from
within the nation" and which needs more than national
guarantees: it is the right of every human being to
membership in a political community. 31
Once the political community has become universalized -- once
the political reference point is above the nation-state -rights can be conceived both that are universal in quality and
that spring from a given political community.
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Thus, what initially appears as a contradiction in her
political thought -- that rights spring only from the activity
of plurality and that the Nazis should be condemned for
committing crimes against humanity (a crime that relies on a
notion of human rights that seems completely apolitical) -- is
resolved by universalizing the political community from which
rights spring.

According to Arendt, rights no longer "spring

from within the nation" but from the One World, the history of
which is written, for the first time, by all of humanity.
History -- "organized remembrance" 32

--

is no longer English,

French, Jewish or German, but rather Human.
The international implications of the universalization of
politics are far-reaching.

First, while the universal political

community may exist, it has not yet been internationally
acknowledged or institutionalized.

This is demonstrated by the

fact that all attempts to achieve the acceptance of universal
human rights have ignored the fact that such rights require a
universal political community from which to spring.
Contrary to the best-intentioned humanitarian attempts to
obtain new declarations of human rights from international
organizations, it should be understood that this idea
transcends the present sphere of international law which
still operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and
treaties between sovereign states; and, for the time being,
a sphere above the nations does not exist. 33

32.
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Arendt claims that institutionalization is justified and, in
fact, required, because it is possible, for the first time in
history, to offend humanity itself, not just parts of it:

the

precedent of committing crimes against humanity has been set.
Thus,
the emergence of mankind as one political entity,
makes the new concept "crimes against humanity" . . . the
first and most important notion of international law . . .
with this notion international law transcends its present
sphere, which has to do only with those laws and agreements
that, in peace and war, regulate the intercourse of
sovereign nations, and enters the sphere of a law that is
above the nations. 34
Arendt calls upon the international political community to
recognize super-national law and make human rights universal.
Super-national laws require super-national institutions.
Therefore, unlike Burke, Arendt appears to see no point in
conserving the institutions of the past:

the international

institutions have already been shown to be completely inadequate
-- in fact, they have been uprooted by these new crimes and they
can not be reclaimed.

But while it is clear that Arendt hopes

to achieve an acknowledgement of this one international
community, it is also clear that she does not seek to replace
the nation-state system with a world government, an idea that
elicits suspicion from her:
. . . a world government is indeed within the realm of
possibility, but one may suspect that in reality it might
differ considerably from the version promoted by
idealistic-minded organizations. 35
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Any single sovereign government is just as likely to make the
mistakes that have been made over and over by single sovereign
nation-states.
For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of
practical political possibilities, that one fine day a
highly organized and mechanized humanity [governed by a
single world government] will conclude quite democratically
-- namely by majority decision -- that for humanity as a
whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts
thereof. 36
Here is demonstrated again Arendt's profound dissatisfaction
with absolute sovereignty.

Fearing a repeat of the nation-

state-territory trinity that permitted nationalities in Europe
to hold the reigns of power over minorities, Arendt is extremely
uncomfortable with power that is unchecked by other spheres of
power.
The presently popular notion of a World Government is based
. on the [Hobbesian] concept of individuals submitting
to a central authority which "overawes them," except that
nations are now taking the place of individuals.
The World
Government [would] overcome and eliminate authentic
politics, that is, different peoples getting along with
each other in the full force of their power. 37
Just as the American formula of federalism is praised because,
as mentioned earlier, the American revolutionaries recognized
that "tyranny and sovereignty are the same" and therefore
devised a form of government that permitted power to be checked
by power, 38 so Arendt suggests that any international law-giving
authority must be both universally acknowledged and checked by
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other spheres of power.
Rather than terminating national sovereignty, Arendt wants
to re-awaken the limits to national sovereignty that had been
set, for utilitarian purposes, in the past.
Theoretically, in the sphere of international law, it had
always been true that sovereignty was no where more
absolute than in matters of "emigration, naturalization,
nationality, and expulsion"; the point, however, is that
practical consideration and the silent acknowledgement of
common interests restrained national sovereignty until the
rise of totalitarian regimes. 39
If national sovereignty is limited again, appeals to human
rights can be politically and philosophically "heard" between
and within nation-states.

However, national sovereignty can

only be limited by another sphere of political power.
Thus, Arendt moves beyond Burke's criticism of the Rights
of Man, armed with the experience of the twentieth century.
Whereas Burke was preoccupied with preserving English
civilization, Arendt is concerned with opening a new space in
which a new, higher layer of political discourse can occur so
that, not just English civilization but, the whole of human
civilization can be preserved.

Only in such a political context

can human rights take on the universal quality that they require
for enforcement and can crimes against humanity be successfully
deterred.

39. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 278, emphasis
added.
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Intranational Political Deterrents
It is a mistake to think that Arendt offers only one
solution to the problem of how to implement human rights.
approach contains a second component:
structure of the nation-state.

Her

changing the political

Arendt would like to see the

distinction that she makes between nation and state put into
practice.

When such a distinction is made, the behavior of

nations would be checked by other spheres of power within the
state; indeed, the state would no longer be a nation-state.
Thus, the sovereignty of the nations would be limited, not by
outside forces, but by the state itself.

These limitations, she

thinks, would be more effective because they would spring from
the political community itself.
As mentioned above, Arendt praises the American federal
formula for creating a sphere in which power could check power -although it does not go far enough. 40

The power-checking

mechanism inherent in federalism is directed in a different
dimension than is that in the separation of powers between the
three branches of government.

Where the separation of powers

was intended to prevent the rise of a powerful monarch (tyranny
from above), federalism, which creates many spheres of power,
prevents the rise of factions

(tyranny from below).

Arendt

contends that, in Europe, the lack of additional spheres of
power permitted the state to become the nation-state.
Disagreeing with the interpretations of the founders that these

40.
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preventive measures resulted in robbing all parties of political
power,

Arendt argues, on the other hand, that federalism

actually increased power by creating an environment in which
power would never be left unckecked.

Thus, federalism is

solicitous of power.
Clearly the true objective of the American Constitution was
not to limit power but to create more power, actually to
establish and duly constitute an entirely new power center
41

The new power center is the power balance between the states and
the federal government, dislocated from the center of
administrative activities.
Arendt goes on to argue for a system that could be adopted
by European nation-states.

The council system, a very localized

federation such as the one that arose during the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956, would make significant headway in fighting
nationalism.

Without the assistance of "professional

revolutionaries," the councils were innocent of prerevolutionary plans for the post-revolutionary society.
were founded on mutual trust.

They

In addition, "their sole demand

was for freedom" not economic liberation. 42

As another

commentator points out, Arendt admired that, unlike other
attempts at a council system, the Hungarian councils were purely

41.

Ibid., 154.

42. Gabriel Masooane Tlaba, Politics and Freedom: Human Action
and Will in the Thought of Hannah Arendt (New York: University
Press of America, 1987), 59.

82

political and not burdened with administrative preoccupations. 43
The party system, on the other hand, does not encourage
individual participation.

Rather, it provides only

representation.
The conflict between the two systems, the parties and the
councils, came to the fore in all twentieth-century
revolutions.
The issue at stake was representation versus
action and participation. The councils were organs of
action, the revolutionary parties were organs of
representation . . . 44
Where the parties sought to build a structure in which action
would be limited to the founding of the new state, councils
sought to build a system in which action could be
institutionalized, bringing a balance of action and order. 45
But, she claims very little political thought has been
devoted to this type of federalism.

According to Arendt, this

system of "elementary republics" is generally ignored by
historians -- even those sympathetic to revolution remain
ignorant of its unprecedented nature:
[historians] failed to understand to what extent the
council system confronted them with an entirely new form of
government, with a new space for freedom which was
constituted and organized during the course of the
revolution itself. 46
Presuming that the council system was nothing more than a
temporary structure that held the state together until the
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revolution ended, historians and revolutionaries expected
stability and quiet to follow the revolution.

Arendt expects

political, although not structural, fluidity -- not, it seems,
stability.
Arendt goes on to contend that the federal system is the

• only alternative to the nation-state that has the capacity to
control ethnic hegemony because it is the only system in which
powerful factions or parties can not, for all intents and
purposes, rule the state. 47

Instead of increasing the power of

"the many", the council system, properly conceived, increased
the power of "every one".«

By dividing the many into small

groups, each individual's actions count, because they are seen
and heard by fellow citizens.

Thus, Arendt insists that the

council system's political organ is the individual.
Arendt applies this claim to her critique of the nationstate system elsewhere, emphasizing again the power-balancing
capacity of federalism:
. the larger need of our civilization with its "growing
unity" on one side, and its growing national
conscientiousness of peoples on the other, would be met
with the idea of federation.
Within federated structures,
nationality would become a personal status rather than a
territorial one. 49
With nationality thus kept under tight limits, by returning it
to the private sphere and by recreating the public sphere, the
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state can then take on the responsibility of protector of rights
and the individual, not the group, becomes the medium for
politics.
Thus, the proper form of the "country" is the state,
impartial and fluid.

And the state, stripped of the nation, is

the only organ through which rights can honestly be defended and
safe-guarded.
The state.
is the supreme protector of a law which
guarantees man his rights as man, his rights as citizen and
his rights as a national . . . and this function is not at
all affected through the number of nationalities which are
protected within the framework of its legal institutions. 50
The limit, then, to national sovereignty is not only potentially
found by creating a sphere for action above nations.

In

addition, it can be found by creating a sphere for action within
nations through the council system.

Thus, Arendt presents two options with which to implement
her notion of human rights.

It seems clear that the

intranational implementation strategy is preferred by her -- she
has fewer hesitations about it.

While an international solution

is considered, no one, specific, international solution can be
adopted without strong reservations on her part.

50.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

Earth poetizes, field to field
with trees interlinear, and lets
us weave our own paths around
the plowed land, into the world.
People go about, no one is lost.
Arendt, 1952

Arendt wrote these verses during one of her early trips to
Paris after the close of the Second World War.

The lines

indicate that much of her personal distress over the events of
the war was beginning to dissipate. 1

This first celebratory

poem envisions a new world in which "no one is lost," a telling
reminder of the centrality that the themes of rootlessness and
world alienation play in her political thinking.

The "joke"

which had played over and over in her own mind since her
imprisonment in 1939 was finally mute -- although it would
certainly speak again.
Arendt's criticism of traditional human rights emphasizes
their inability to bring individuals and peoples "into the
world."

1.

Instead of connecting them to the world, such rights
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disperse individuals further into nature, into pure, unreal
abstraction.

Thus, they cannot hope to dissolve the alienation

that permits individuals and peoples to be thought of and
treated as superfluous, as not belonging.
Arendt's thoughts concerning human rights attempt to answer
this critical weakness.

By examining what forces drove human

beings out of their world, she strives to determine what forces
will bring them back.

Only by becoming a part of the world once

again can individuals and peoples hope to find political freedom
and access their true active "natures".
Like traditional human rights theorists, Arendt links her
notion of human rights to her understanding of what it means to
be human: diverse in nature and plural in the polis.

However,

as Arendt points out, the necessity for human rights does not
come merely from this logical connection but from the peril in
which humankind finds itself during the twentieth century.
Human rights are necessary because we have lost touch with the
human condition.
empirical fact:
in physical form.

And this last claim is based on hard,
we now have observed the abstract human being
Therefore, human rights must be matched to

what this abstract human being looks like -- not to what we
think it might look like.
Traditional human rights theorists can not be said to have
done this.

Rather, they take the solution of nineteenth

century's problems and apply it to today's problems without
pausing to question whether the two sets of problems are the
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same.

Like the Isreali court, traditional human rights

theorists argue that genocide represents just one more in a long
series of examples, albeit a radical one, of crimes that states
have committed against the individual.
merely a new form of tyranny.

Totalitarianism is

Genocide is the murder of many,

many individuals.
Arendt disagrees.

Totalitarianism and tyranny are not the

same thing; genocide and murder are not the same thing.

What

the twentieth century has witnessed is the transformation of the
public realm into an instrument not of a particularly evil
individual but of an anti-world ideology.

Traditional theories

of human rights may have the capacity to dissolve tyranny, but
they completely lack the capacity to fight totalitarianism.
Since the disease is new, a new therapy must be created and
prescribed.
The root of Arendt's diagnosis is not that human rights
were denied the Jews or anyone else.

Rather, civilization as a

whole, she believes, could self-destruct because human beings
have lost touch with their own defining characteristic: human
beings do not know what it means to be political because they do
not know what it means to be plural.

Under such circumstances,

Arendt asks, can we call ourselves human at all?

If not, what

is to become of us?
In addition to the fact that she contends that the
traditional notions of human rights did not help the stateless
peoples and persons, she does not see human rights violations as
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the cause of statelessness.

Such theories of human rights were

merely a therapy prescribed by most liberal theorists that did
no good.

Like a placebo, they may have made individuals feel

better, but the prescribing them was essentially wasted effort.
In Arendt's analysis, the concept of human rights must be
completely revamped before it can be an effective therapeutic
tool.
First, Arendt contends that human rights are not a priori
to the political community; instead, they are discovered within
the political community.
be "made".

As suggested above, human rights must

Second, human rights do not defend the individual,

but the whole of civilization.

They help resolve the

individual's alienation from the world by safe-guarding the
world.

Third, assuring human rights is not Arendt's goal -- in

her estimation, human rights are not the highest moral good.
Rather, resolving world alienation is her goal and human rights
help achieve it.

Finally, human rights do not reflect the

nature of what a single human being should look like in the
political community, but rather they reflect the nature of the
human condition of plurality:

how the lone individual is not

really human and how he or she must adjust and shed his or her
biology in order to become part of a community.
While Arendt sees no "quick fix" to the world's problems,
she does see potential for solving them.

She argues that during

the nineteenth century the sovereignty of the nation-state was
limited.

Those limitations prevented the nation-states from
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performing certain crimes.

For example, while forced migration

was not new to the twentieth century, during the nineteenth
century, nation-states were limited in how extensive a forced
migration could be.

The rules of inter-state treaties and the

inter-dependence of the European nation-states presented
utilitarian reasons for not committing these types of crimes
against each other.

Thus, while each nation-state thought of

itself as sovereign, it really wasn't.

Each nation-state

recognized the limits of their own power.
Arendt argues that nation-states have lost the limits to
their sovereignty that they once had and she looks for ways in
which such limitations can be reinstituted.

She suggests two

models: an international one and an intranational one.
incorporate the ideals of federalism.

Both

Federalism is the only

political structure that Arendt believes is capable of limiting
sovereignty to such a degree that no component of the human race
could be excluded from the human world; thus, it is the only
structure which can guarantee that human rights will be
observed.
It is clear that Arendt believes that federalism should be
instituted within the nation-state -- it would have the effect
of transforming it into a true state.

However, she is vague

about what type of federal structure should be developed above
states.

More than just requiring a between-state mechanism,

which is what Europe had during the nineteenth century, Arendt
argues that an above-state mechanism is necessary to limit
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national sovereignty.

A world government, though, has too many

trappings of the nation-state structure for Arendt to be
satisfied with it.

Thus, Arendt leaves many questions

unanswered when it comes to an international solution to the
problems of unlimited national sovereignty.

Although she argued

that federated structures would be sufficient to limit
sovereignty for those nations that adopted such internal
structures, she sensed that an international effort would be
required to avoid the emergence of crimes against humanity which
could still be performed by nations that still had the potential
to do so -- i.e., those that were not federations.

Yet she was

at a loss to construct such an international system except to
say that it must have the power to act above, not just between,
nations.
In some respects, then, Arendt's thoughts on human rights
is clear.

In other respects, she is quite vague.

What can't be

denied is that Arendt included human rights in the necessary
solutions to the problems that plagued the twentieth century.
However, many questions remain unanswered.

An Arendtian Theory of Human Rights?
As this thesis has discovered, Hannah Arendt had many ideas
about human rights and their role in resolving the world
alienation that characterizes contemporary society.

But can it

be said that she developed a theory of human rights or are we
putting together pieces of her various theories that she herself
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would not have linked?

In other words, if Arendt's thoughts on

human rights are truly tangential from the body of her
theoretical work, they might be thought of as anecdotal and,
therefore, would not be required reading for students of human
rights.
Ignoring the influence that Arendt's thought on human
rights have already had in the real world, 2 if a theory of human
rights is a systematic and comprehensive response to a political
crisis which explicitly centers on human rights violations,
Arendt could not be said to have developed one.

Certainly

because of the negative nature of her discussion of human
rights, it seems unlikely that she could ever be considered a
"human rights theorist."

However, sharp attention paid to what

she doesn't say in reference to a positive notion of human
rights suggests that another point of view may be valid.
Arendt is vehement about her criticisms of traditional
human rights theories: she suggests that they have no political
meaning at all.

However, in Eichmann in Jerusalem, she defends

the notion of crimes against humanity; and such crimes directly
presuppose some sort of right of humanity.

Yet the reader is

left to draw his or her own inferences concerning her promotion
of human rights.

In other works, she uses such phrases as "if

human rights exist, they would look like

II

Again, she is

uncharacteristically non-committal about her opinion on this

2.
Stephen J. Whitfield, Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and
Totalitarianism (Philedelphia: Temple University Press, 1980),
110-112.
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subject.

Finally, Arendt was uncomfortable about where her 1949

article concerning human rights fit in to the rest of her work,
revising it, expanding it, and more telling, not knowing where
to place it in The Origins of Totalitarianism. 3
Perhaps the fact that Arendt spends so little time building
a new human rights theory indicates that she felt a need to
distance herself from the traditional language of rights
altogether.

Indeed, referring to human rights as "human rights"

might have prevented her from developing fully her own thoughts
on rights.
We are accustomed to thinking of human rights as Arendt
seems to lead us to do when she criticizes traditional notions
of them -- connecting them to our ideas about liberalism and
individualism.

Thus, some might argue that the real question

may not be whether Arendt can be called a human rights theorist
but whether she can be called a liberal theorist.

This is an

interesting train of thought because it leads us straight to the
difficulty that may have led Arendt to her choice not to write
an explicit and comprehensive theory of human rights.

Can we

talk about rights and at the same time divorce them from their
tie to individualism?

If we cannot disengage more general ideas

of rights from eighteenth century individualism, neither can we
disengage human rights from the more general notions of rights
-- even if we wish to update them with the experiences of the
twentieth century.

3.

In other words, we can reform traditional

Young-Bruehl, 257, 285.
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notions of human rights, but we cannot uproot them or change
their very nature.
Arendt wants to refocus our approach to rights altogether.
Like Burke, she wants to guide us away from universal,
individualistic rights.

Speaking in the language of traditional

rights theorists would distract from this effort.

Relative to

traditional rights theorists, Arendt discounts the individual
altogether.

She emphasizes, instead, the world -- what

individuals and peoples have created that both "separates and
joins them."

Individualism ignores the world, treating the

individual as the only relevant political entity.

Arendt

stresses the "thingness" of the world in order to convince her
reader that the world really exists and is valuable.
the world is the foundation for politics.

In fact,

Individuals create

something other than themselves when they come together in a
community.

This thing that they create is independent from the

individual in the same way that other people are independent
from the individual.

Arendt wants to heighten our awareness of

this "other" and she does so by way of the language she uses.
Where traditional rights theorists are accustomed to discussing
autonomy, individual conscience and moral freedom, Arendt
ignores these terms.

Instead, she is only concerned with the

individual once he or she is in a group.
Arendt's emphasis on context -- the world that joins and
separates individuals -- is impossible to articulate in the
language of traditional rights theories.

Traditional rights
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theories use rights to protect the individual from the
possiblity of tyrannical political power.

Hence, they protect

the individual from his or her own political context.

In doing

so, they alienate individuals from each other and from the world
in which they live.

Traditional rights theories can not

possibly retain the category of obligation, transforming it
instead into "hazardous charity", because they have done away
with the foundation for obligation -- the priority of community.
Arendt revives the idea of obligation by recognizing that the
individual (really, the human race itself) can never be safe
without a secure political community.

Hence, it is the

political community that Arendt wants to protect because, one
might say, only through it can the individual be protected.

The

first step in this protection is getting her reader to value the
world as a priority and to see it for what it is -- the
foundation of political community.
The language of traditional rights theories can not contain
Arendt's thoughts on political community.
could not use it.

For this reason, she

Instead, she invented her own language.

In

the same way that human rights underpin the terms individual
conscience, moral freedom and autonomy for traditional human
rights theorists, beneath all of Arendt's discussions on
rootlessness, world alienation and superfluousness runs her own
current of human rights.

The backdrop of much of Arendt's

thinking is a mostly silent, though sometimes expressed,
commitment to her own version of human rights.

It is a backdrop
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that, when revealed momentarily, creates discord for the reader.
One might be compelled to ask, "Can rights be both a priori and
derived from the community?"
Indeed, this thesis began with this question.

The very

obscurity of Arendt's thinking on rights led to it.

However,

the source of the obscurity was not Arendt's thoughts themselves
but the traditional linkage between human rights and
individualism.

Once that link is severed, the radical nature of

Arendt's views on human rights becomes apparent.

Therefore, the

view that Arendt's thoughts on human rights are tangential to
her political thought is promoted by the blindness to the
possibility that human rights can be grounded in something other
than the individual.
rights literature.

Thus, Arendt must be included in the human
Not doing so dismisses the original nature

of her thought.

The Efficacy of Arendt's Theory
If one is to take Arendt's thoughts on human rights
seriously, one is compelled to ask whether Arendt does a better
job than the traditional human rights theorists in bringing this
"step-child" human rights home to its proper place in political
thought.

As with Arendt's criticism of traditional theories of

human rights, this question must be answered on both
philosophical and practical planes.
First, does Arendt do a better job at defending the idea of
human rights in philosophical terms?

For most human rights
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theorists, human rights are the focal point of their theories of
individualism, being frequently considered the contemporary
equivalent of the Rights of Man. 4

Arendt, however, does not

make them the focal point of her theory.

To do so would lead

her to the very same difficulties faced by traditional
theorists: i.e., if human rights are owned by and protect only
the individual, the community is not compelled to observe them.
In more concrete terms, a community need not be seen as
contradicting itself when it decides to observe one person's
human rights and not another person's.

One of those persons can

be defined as not human or not human enough to be protected by
such rights.

This contradiction, says Arendt, is justified by

the very structure of the nation-state.
The contradiction, though, can only be justified in an
environment which does not regard the world, the law or the
mechanisms of the state as being separate from the nation.
Thus, Arendt emphasizes that not the individual but the
community must be the locus of politics.

She does not speak of

expressing one's interests against the community but of being a
member and being a distinct component of the community -distinct in that the individual retains his or her unique
identity and a component in that he or she cannot ever be
considered as a completely separate political entity from the

4.
J. Roland Pennock, "Rights, Natural Rights, and Human
Rights -- A General View," chap. in Human Rights: NOMOS XXIII,
eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York
University Press, 1967), 3ff.
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community.
By such an emphasis, Arendt moves the concept of human
rights to a new location in political thought.

Whereas in·

individualism, human rights are the focal point of liberalism
and ought to be pursued as ends in themsleves, in Arendt's
thought, human rights are a tool that helps assure the rebirth
of politics.

Human rights are no longer the end of politics but

are instead only the means through which politics can be
approached.

In this way, Arendt underlines that the end of

politics is not the individual's satisfaction but the extension
of the individual to matters that go beyond his or her immediate
concerns.

Only through such an extension can the individual

hope to touch worldly everlastingness.

Any theory that makes

the individual its end, on the other hand, is inherently antipolitical because it is anti-world.

It encourages the growth of

world alienation.
The effect of this relocation of human rights within the
political framework is that human rights are removed from the
realm of charity and placed into the realm of obligation.
Indeed, with the survival of the political community itself at
stake, human rights become politically compelling -- independent
of the issues raised by the "individual" case at hand.

It can

be presumed that, where world alienation has dissipated, the
priority of the survival of the world would take precedence over
all interests that required the exclusion of any people or
individual from the community.

Thus, by giving their
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application political urgency, Arendt provides a better defense
for human rights than is provided by traditional theorists.
Arendt offers a way to connect the universal value of human
rights with the contingent political reality.
However, it remains to be examined whether Arendt's thought
on human rights can improve the practical situation of those
whose rights are denied.

As stated above, where world

alienation does not exist, the tendency to exclude individuals
and peoples should be counteracted by human rights.

Can this

new understanding of human rights, though, assist the
realization of the end of world alienation as Arendt seems to
want it to do?

A full response to this question is beyond the

scope of this thesis.
Briefly, though, any response would have to center on the
universality of Arendt's human rights claims and their
unprecedented character (i.e., that they involve only the right
to belong and no other individual rights).

At first glance, it

seems unlikely that Arendt's claims for universal rights could
improve the plight of those whose rights are denied any more
than traditional notions of human rights.

If human rights are

not politically rooted, as they are not by definition, then it
is not possible for a universal claim to possess any political
force that could strengthen the case against human rights
violators.

Persons and peoples with political power need only

argue the inapplicability of such universal claims to their
political realities.
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On the other hand, based on the presumption that all
societies are implicitly pluralistic (because of the necessary
diversity of the individuals and peoples who inhabit each of
them), one could argue that, while Arendt's notion of human
rights does not bring immediate salvation, it enlarges the
circle of persons who must support human rights.

Added to the

contingent of human rights defenders would be those
constituencies concerned with preserving or creating the
political community.

These groups would be forced to recognize,

first, the ties between being human and belonging to a community
and, second, the necessity for the community to be an inclusive
rather than an exclusive entity.

Thus, the focus turns from

protecting the individual who exists in a vacuum to protecting
the inidividual's political context.
One demonstration of the increase in constituency can be
seen in Stephen Whitfield's description of the application of
Arendt's notion of human rights by Justice Warren in several
expatriation cases.

The Chief Justice wrote:

Citizenship is man's basic right . . . It is nothing less
than the right to have rights . . . Remove this priceless
possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced
and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. He has no
lawful claim to protection from any nation, and no nation
may assert rights on his behalf. 5
While the Justice does not claim that the community is protected
by Arendt's notion of human rights, he recognizes the link
between being human and belonging to a political community.

5.

As quoted by Whitfield, 111.

The
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destructiveness of depriving a person of his or her political
context became the basis for many of his subsequent opinions.
The application of Arendt's notion of human rights seems to
make it impossible for a person to believe in both democracy and
nationalism at the same time.

Arendt's ideas concerning human

rights make these two ideals contradictory.

The pluralism

demanded by Arendt's human rights requires the inclusion of all
persons into the political community.

Thus, Arendt breaks the

link between the nation and sovereignty; she prevents the
transformation of human rights into citizens' rights.

In this

more narrow way, Arendt's notion of human rights might have been
more helpful to the stateless peoples and persons than were the
traditional notions of human rights.

Stateless persons, instead

of reviving their culture or begging for inclusion, would have
had the option to fight for reforms of the nation-state system
itself.
In sum, Arendt moves the concept of human rights from being
an end in itself and the focal point of individualism to being a
tool that helps assure the rebirth of politics.

This adjustment

satisfies her because, under her scheme, the goal of politics
could not be subject to the private needs of the individual.

At

the same time, her theory requires the prevention and
destruction of totalitarianism -- the phenomenon that all rights
theorists agree presents the most potent threat to human rights.
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